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The free public services doctine (also lmown as the municpal cost recoveryrule) states
that a government entity may not recover from a torteasor the costs of public services
occasioned by the tortfeasors wrongdoing. This Article traces the history of the doctine and
argues for its elmination. The Article ailicizes case law supportig the doctrine and raises
objections based on fairness, efficiency, and institutional concerns about the proper limits of
judifcial policy maing.
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I. NTRODUCTION
According to the free public services doctrine, a governmental
entity may not recover from a tortfeasor the costs of public services
occasioned by the tortfeasor's wrongdoing. These costs must instead
be borne by the public as a whole through taxation. As one court put
it, "[tihe general rule is that public expenditures made in the
performance of governmental functions are not recoverable." The
1. Koch v. Consol. Edison Co., 468 N.E.2d 1, 7-8 (N.Y. 1984) (rejecting a claim by
New York City against a power company to recover "costs incurred for wages, salaries,
728 [Vol. 76:727
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doctrine has been adopted in at least ten states, including New York
and California,2 and it has been embraced by federal courts Courts
overtime and other benefits of police, fire, sanitation and hospital personnel from whom
services . . . were required" in response to rioting that took place during a citywide blackout
caused by the power company's gross negligence).
2. See, e.g., Kodiak Island Borough v. Exxon Corp., 991 R2d 757, 760-61 (Alaska
1999) (allowing recovery of oil spill cleanup costs only where permitted by statute); County
of San Luis Obispo v. Abalone Alliance, 223 Cal. Rptr. 846, 859 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)
(denying recovery of law enforcement costs); Penelas v. Arms Tech., Inc., No. 99-1941CA-
06, 1999 WL 1204353, at *2 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 13, 1999), aff'don othergrounds, 778 So. 2d
1042 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 799 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 2001) (denying recovery of law
enforcement and emergency services costs); Mayor & Council of Morgan City v. Jesse J.
Fontenot, Inc., 460 So. 2d 685, 687-88 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1984) (denying recovery of fire
suppression costs); Town of Freetown v. Nev Bedford Wholesale Tire, Inc., 423 N.E.2d 997,
998 (Mass. 1981) (denying recovery of fire suppression costs); Township of Cherry Hill v.
Conti Constr. Co., 527 A.2d 921, 922 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (denying recovery for
emergency services in response to rupture of natural gas main); City of Bridgeton v. B.P. Oil,
Inc., 369 A.2d 49, 54 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976) (denying recovery of oil spill cleanup
costs); Koch, 468 N.E.2d at 7-8 (denying recovery of costs due to citywide blackout); In re
James AA, 594 N.Y.S.2d 430,432 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (denying recovery of state attorney
general counsel fees); Austin v. City of Buffalo, 586 N.Y.S.2d 841, 842 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992)
(denying recovery of fire suppression costs); State v. Long Island Lighting Co., 493 N.Y.S.2d
255, 257 (Nassau County Ct. 1985) (denying recovery of costs related to removing fallen
power lines); City of Pittsburgh v. Equitable Gas Co., 512 A.2d 83, 84 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1986) (denying recovery of emergency response costs to a natural gas main explosion); Bd.
of Supervisors v. U.S. Home Corp., 18 Va. Cir. 181 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1989) (denying recovery of
clean-up costs related to an oil spill); Dep't of Natural Res. v. Wis. Power & Light Co., 321
N.W2d 286, 289 (Wis. 1981) (denying recovery of fire suppression costs); Town of Howard
v. Soo Line R.R., 217 N.W2d 329,331-32 (Wis. 1974) (denying recovery of fire suppression
costs). A recent article on the doctrine misleadingly cites additional cases in Arkansas,
Hawaii, Maryland, and Michigan. The first three of these involve claims by individual
plaintiffs, not government entities, and the fourth deals with limitations on a statutory right of
recovery for nuisance abatement. None of them indicate the adoption of the free public
services doctrine. See Sarah L. Olson, The Free Public Services Doctrine: Government Cost
Recovery Claims, FOR THE DEFENSE, Sept. 2001, at 27, 28 (citing Ouachita Wilderness Inst.,
Inc. v. Mergen, 947 S.W2d 780 (Ark. 1997) (individual plaintiff); Thomas v. Pang, 811 P.2d
821 (Haw. 1991) (individual plaintiff); Crews v. Hollenbach, 751 A.2d 481 (Md. 2000)
(individual plaintiff); Brandon Township v. Jerome Builders, Inc., 263 N.W2d 326 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1977) (denying a statutory claim for recovery)).
3. Acceptance of the doctrine in federal courts has been mixed. Some federal courts
favor the doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 US. 301,313-14 (1947)
(denying recovery for hospitalization and sick-pay benefits for a soldier injured by the
tortfeasor); In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz, 954 E2d 1279, 1310 (7th Cir. 1992) (per
curiam) (denying recovery of oil spill cleanup costs); District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc.,
750 E2d 1077, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (denying recovery of disaster response costs following
an airplane crash); City of Flagstaff v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 719 F.2d 322,
323 (9th Cir. 1983) (denying recovery of petroleum spill cleanup costs); Bd. of Comm'rs v.
Nuclear Assurance Corp., 588 F Supp. 856, 864-65 (E.D. Ohio 1984) (denying recovery for
expenses incurred in preparing for potential nuclear accident); Allenton Volunteer Fire Dep't
v. Soo Line R.R., 372 E Supp. 422, 423 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (denying recovery of fire
suppression costs); In re Sincere Navigation Corp., 327 E Supp. 1024, 1026 (E.D. La. 1971)
(denying recovery of rescue costs arising from a maritime collision); United States v.
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have employed the free public services doctrine in a variety of
contexts, denying recovery of government expenditures necessitated
by negligently caused fires, oil spills, and airline crashes.' Most
recently, several courts have cited the doctrine as a basis for dismissing
municipal lawsuits against the gun industry.' In these cases, the courts
have held that taxpayers, not gun makers, should bear the costs of law
enforcement and emergency medical services rendered in response to
gun violence. While many courts do not refer to the rule as the free
public services doctrine, it was given this name by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in a 1991 case, Inre Oil Spi
by the AMOCO Cadiz The court borrowed the name from a similar
French law principle, gratu6 des services publics, but cited American
cases as the doctrine's source in US. law. When applied to cities, the
doctrine is sometimes called the municipal cost recovery rule.'
In this Article, I argue that the free public services doctrine
should be eliminated. The doctrine shields industrial tortfeasors from
liability for cleanup costs, passing those costs on to the public. It
constitutes a tort subsidy to industry and functions as an insurance
scheme for industrial accidents paid for by taxpayers. As we shall see,
Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co., 150 E Supp. 326, 331 (D. Md. 1957) (denying recovery of
healthcare and sick-pay benefits of an injured soldier).
Other federal court decisions either declare exceptions to, explicitly reject, or ignore the
doctrine. See, e.g., Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 200-01 (1967)
(allowing recovery of costs related to removing sunken vessels from a river); Pennsylvania v.
Gen. Pub. Utils. Corp., 710 E2d 117, 121-23 (3d Cir. 1983) (allowing recovery of
government response costs and productivity losses arising out of a nuclear accident); City of
Evansville v. Ky. Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 E2d 1008, 1018-19 (7th Cir. 1979) (explaining
the federal common law right of recovery for water pollution cleanup); United States v.
Denver & Rio Grande W R.R., 547 E2d 1 101, 1105 (10th Cir. 1977) (allowing recovery of
fire suppression costs); United States v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 130 E2d 308, 310 (4th
Cir. 1942) (allowing recovery of fire suppression costs); City of Manchester v. Nat'l Gypsum
Co., 637 F. Supp. 646, 651-52 (D.R.I. 1986) (allowing recovery of asbestos removal costs);
United States v. Ill. Terminal R.R., 501 E Supp. 18, 21 (E.D. Mo. 1980) (explaining the
federal common law right of recovery for nuisance abatement costs); United States v.
Andrews, 206 E Supp. 50, 53 (E.D. Idaho 1961) (allowing recovery of fire suppression
costs).
4. See, e.g., In re Oil Spill, 954 E2d at 1310 (oil spill); AirFla., Inc., 720 E2d at
1080 (airline crash); New Bedford Wholesale Tire, Inc., 423 N.E.2d at 998 (fire).
5. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A., Corp., 126 F. Supp. 2d 882,911
(E.D. Pa. 2000), aff'd on other grounds, 277 E3d 415 (3d Cir. 2002); Ganim v. Smith &
Wesson Corp., 26 Conn. L. Rptr. 39, 46 n.7 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999), aff'o 780 A.2d 98
(Conn. 2001) (lawsuit by City ofBridgeport, Connecticut); Penelas, 1999'WL 1204353, at *2
(lawsuit by Miami-Dade County); City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., [2000 Transfer
Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 15,880, at 55,181 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2000).
6. 954 E2d at 1310.
7. Id. (citing Air Fa., Inc., 720 E2d at 1079-80; Atchison, 719 E2d at 322).
8. See, e.g., Beretta USA., Corp., 126 E Supp. 2d at 894.
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the doctrine does not have particularly deep roots in the common law,
dating back only to the 1970s. Moreover, the courts have failed to
offer adequate justification for it. Case law concerning the doctrine is
full of question-begging and misplaced arguments about judicial
deference to legislative policy making. Furthermore, the doctrine is
vulnerable to several objections based on fairness, efficiency, and
institutional concerns that are not addressed in the case law. First, the
doctrine unfairly shields from liability tortfeasors who harm
governmental plaintiffs where they would otherwise be liable to private
plaintiffs, and it passes the losses caused by those tortfeasors on to
taxpayers. Second, it inefficiently externalizes the costs of tortfeasors'
wrongdoing, costs that could easily be internalized by the purchase of
liability insurance. Third, it is an improper exercise in judicial policy
making, providing to negligent industries a hidden subsidy that courts
should not support in the absence of explicit legislative approval. The
most adequate response to these objections is to eliminate the doctrine
altogether.
My argument proceeds as follows. Part II of the Article identifies
some of the doctrine's antecedents and marks its appearance as a
general rule in the 1970s. Contrary to the impression given by many
courts, the doctrine does not have a long history as part of the common
law. Part I delineates the scope of the doctrine, pointing out
limitations and exceptions to the doctrine. Part IV further clarifies the
doctrine by distinguishing it from more established doctrines with
which it is often associated and sometimes confused. Part V exposes
the inadequacies of judicial decisions that purport to justify the
doctrine. Part VI raises several objections to the doctrine not
addressed by the case law. Part VII discusses some of the implications
of eliminating the doctrine altogether. Finally, Part VIII concludes
with a brief summary of the argument.
II. THE ORIGIN OF THE FREE PUBLIC SERVICES DOCTRINE
Determining the origin of the free public services doctrine is a
somewhat tricky business. As a general rule of common law barring
recovery of public expenditures, the doctrine first appears in the mid-
1970s.9 Prior to this time, however, one finds cases denying recovery
9. The doctrine first appeared in two 1974 Wisconsin cases, Alienton Volunteer Fre
Departent v Soo Line Railroad 372 E Supp. 422, 423 (E.D. Wis. 1974), and Town of
Howard v Soo Line Rairoaa 217 N.W2d 329, 330 (Wis. 1979). The doctrine next appeared
in the 1976 New Jersey case, City ofBridgeton v B.P Oil, In c., 369 A.2d 49, 54 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1976), without citation to the earlier Wisconsin cases. Most subsequent cases
2002] 731
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of specific types of public expenditures. For example, there are cases
as far back as 1903 rejecting government claims against criminals for
the costs of their capture and incarceration."0 Similarly, a 1947 United
States Supreme Court case denied the federal government the right to
recover in common law tort the costs of medical care, wages, and loss
of services from tortfeasors who injure soldiers." In addition, cases
from the 1950s and 1960s dealing with government recovery of fire
suppression costs from tortfeasors based on statutory provisions are
often cited in support of the free public services doctrine.'" Although
there is no common law question in this last group of cases, they are
understood to imply, and dicta in one of them explicitly states,'3 that
the government has no common law right to recover fire suppression
costs and that any such recovery requires statutory authorization. All
of these cases prior to the 1970s are indeed antecedents to the free
public services doctrine, but they do not provide a solid precedential
foundation for it.
In this Part, I analyze these antecedents to the free public services
doctrine. I argue that none of them provides support for a general rule
barring recovery of public service expenditures. While it would be an
overstatement to claim that the free public services doctrine was made
out of whole cloth, courts have been disingenuous in attempting to
account for it by citing these doctrinal scraps.
concerning the doctrine either directly cite one of these cases or cite cases that cite one of
these cases.
10. See, e.g., Dep't of Mental Hygiene v. Hawley, 379 P.2d 22, 28 (Cal. 1963)
(denying recovery of incarceration costs); Napa State Hosp. v. Yuba County, 71 P. 450, 452
(Cal. 1903) (denying recovery of incarceration costs); County of San Luis Obispo v. Abalone
Alliance, 223 Cal. Rptr. 846, 853 (Cal. Ct App. 1986) (denying recovery of lav enforcement
costs); State Highway & Pub. Works Comm'n v. Cobb, 2 S.E.2d 565, 567 (N.C. 1939)
(denying recovery for costs related to apprehending escaped convict).
11. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 313-14 (1947); see also United
States v. Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co., 150 E Supp. 326, 330-31 (D. Md. 1957) (denying
recovery of costs for hospital services to tort victim).
12. See People v. Wilson, 49 Cal. Rptr. 792, 794 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1966)
(recognizing statutory right of state to recover fire suppression costs and stating further that
the right to recover fire suppression costs is a "creature of statute"); Portsmouth v.
Campanella & Cardi Constr. Co., 123 A.2d 827, 830 (N.H. 1956) (denying right of city to
recover fire suppression costs based on statute); State v. Boston & M. R.R., 105 A.2d 751,
754-55 (N.H. 1954) (recognizing statutory right of state to recover fire suppression costs
from railroad that caused fire).
13. Wilson, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 794.
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A. LawEnforcement Costs Occasioned by Criminal Conduct
Cases rejecting government tort claims against criminals for the
cost of their capture and incarceration are sometimes cited as a source
for the free public services doctrine.'4 In these cases courts have held
that the crimes involved did not constitute private wrongs against the
state for which compensation is available in tort.'5 The principle
established by these cases is that the affront to governmental authority
entailed by the commission of a crime does not itself constitute a tort.
The 1939 case of State Nigh way & Public Works Commission v
Cobb provides a clear illustration of this principle.'6 In that case, the
North Carolina State Highway and Public Works Commission sued
Eddie Cobb, an escapee from the state prison, to recover expenses
arising out of his recapture and return to prison. The North Carolina
Supreme Court reversed a judgment in favor of the state.8 The court
based its rejection of the state's claim on a two-step analysis of the
right of government to recover in tort.'9
As a first step, the court considered the peculiar nature of the
state as a tort plaintiff.
If a tort is pursued by the sovereign, it must be with respect to the
same sort of right and in the same way as may be allowed a private
citizen.... A sovereign, who is also a natural person, may, of course,
bring an action for tort in his individual capacity and with respect to his
individual and proprietary rights....
The State constitutes a sort of intangible sovereignty. Legally
speaking, it cannot be assaulted, slandered, or injured as an individual
with respect to a personality that it does not possess. But it does own
property and has property rights which might be the subject of invasion.
Ifa wrong is committed against it in the nature of a tort, it must be with
respect to such a right.20
The court's analysis here rests on a conception of government as
having a dual legal status of public entity and private person. The
14. See, e.g., David C. McIntyre, Note, Tortfeasor Liability for Disaster Response
Costs: Accounting for the True Cost ofAccidents, 55 FORDHAM L. REX. 1001, 1008 n.44
(1987) ("The rule against common law liability for the cost of government services also has
surfaced in a line of cases involving suits to recover from criminals or criminal suspects the
costs incurred during their apprehension or detention.").
15. See, e.g., Hawley, 379 P.2d at 28; Napa State Hosp., 71 P. at 452; Cobb, 2 S.E.2d
at 567.
16. 2 S.E.2d at 567.
17. Id. at 566.
18. Id. at 568.
19. Id. at 567.
20. Id.
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court explains that the state can sue in common law tort only as a
private person.' Furthermore, as an "intangible" person, only certain
categories of tort apply to it: the state has no physical integrity or
personal dignity; the only common law rights it has are property
rights.' Thus, the state can recover in tort only for violation of its
property rights.
2 3
As a second step, the court explained why the state's expenditure
of public funds for the defendant's recapture was not recoverable in
this case:
It does not appear that the defendant has invaded any property right
of [the] plaintiff except that which may be involved in the expenditure
of the State's public funds for his apprehension after his escape. Since
his recapture was a public duty required by law under a general system
which the State has established, the position of the sovereign towards
such a public expenditure can scarcely be that of a private individual
who has been compelled to spend money because of the tortious
conduct of another. Indeed, in point of legal logic, defendant's yen for
the open spaces and his heeding of the call of the wild was rather the
occasion than the cause of the expenditure, or, at least, did not afford
the compulsion. While his flight was contrary to the will of the
sovereign, as expressed in its law, the expenditure for his recapture was
voluntary2
4
According to the court, although the defendant's escape from prison
prompted the state to expend resources for his recapture, the defendant
is not liable for this loss since the expenditure was "voluntary"'25 The
court does not make clear, however, why the voluntary nature of the
expenditure makes it unrecoverable.
The court explains that because the state's expenditure was
voluntary, the defendant's conduct did not cause it.26 Clearly, however,
the defendant's escape did cause the expenditure insofar as it was a
necessary condition for the expenditure. Perhaps the court means that
the defendant's conduct was not a proximate cause of the expenditure,
because the state's choice to recapture him constituted an intervening
voluntary act that broke the causal chain. But the court itself seems to
equivocate concerning the voluntary nature of the expenditure when it
21. Id
22. See id.
23. For a similar analysis of the dual legal status of municipal government, see Gerald
E. Frug, The Citasa LegalConcep4 93 HAIv. L. REv. 1059, 1104 (1980).
24. Cobb, 2 S.E.2d at 567.
25. Id.
26. Id
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says that the state was duty bound to recapture the defendant under
laws which the state itself established.17 What the court might mean is
that the defendant's conduct did not wrongfully cause the expenditure.
His escape caused the expenditure in the same way a legitimate
competitor causes a business owner to spend resources on advertising,
rather than the way a careless driver causes a fellow motorist to spend
resources on fixing a dent in his car. By asserting that the state's
expenditure was "voluntary," the court might mean that it was not
caused by any wrongdoing on the part of the defendant. The problem
with this explanation is that the defendant's escape (unlike legitimate
business competition) was a legal wrong, and this legal wrong caused
the expenditure.
The key to understanding the court's reasoning lies in the first
step of its analysis, according to which the state can recover in tort only
for violation of its property rights. While it may be true that a wrong
committed by the defendant (his escape from prison) caused the state's
loss, this loss was not caused by the one kind of wrong for which
government may recover in tort-the violation of a property right. The
court explains that the defendant's escape was "a crime against the
sovereignty of the State," which did not involve any violation of its
property rights." Thus, the state cannot recover in tort.
The refusal by courts to allow government recovery of law
enforcement costs from criminals in cases like Cobb does not provide
much of a precedential foundation for the free public services doctrine.
As we shall see, the free public services doctrine rests on a very
different basis. In Cobb, the court denied recovery because the
defendant's criminal violation did not involve any private wrong
against the state that would support recovery in tort. By contrast, the
free public services doctrine bars recovery on the ground that public
service expenditures are never compensable, even where the
defendant's conduct constitutes a private wrong against the
government. Cases rejecting recovery of law enforcement costs focus
on the nature of the wrong, whereas the free public services doctrine
focuses on the type of loss.
B. Federal GovernmentLosses Resulting i om Injury to Soldiers
Another antecedent to the free public services doctrine is the
1947 United States Supreme Court decision in United States v
27. See id at 566.
28. Id. at 567.
2002] 735
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Standard Oil Co. holding that the federal government has no federal
common law right to recover the costs of medical care and sick pay
from tortfeasors who injure soldiers.29 In that case, a negligent truck
driver struck and injured a soldier." The federal government sued the
truck driver's employer for the costs of the soldier's hospitalization and
his pay during the period of his disability.31 In rendering its decision,
the Court asserted that the issue of liability should be determined as a
matter of federal, rather than state, common law.32 It then went on to
provide several grounds for rejecting the government's claim.33
To begin with, the Court viewed the government's claim as
"novel,' distinguishing it from well-established common law prece-
dents concerning the liability of tortfeasors to their victims' employers
and family members.' The Court noted that imposing liability would
require "an exertion of creative judicial power" to place the
government-soldier relation on the same legal footing as master-
servant and family relations.3" This the Court refused to do, asserting
that the freedom of federal courts to "create new common-law
liabilities" was more restricted than that of state courts.36
Next, the Court characterized the issue of whether the govern-
ment should be allowed to recover as essentially "a question of federal
fiscal policy" most appropriately settled by "congressional action"
rather than judicial decision.37 Additionally, the Court held that the
creation of federal common law liability was unnecessary given that
Congress could at any time create a statutory cause of action (which it
subsequently did in the 1962 Federal Medical Care Recovery Act)."M
Finally, the Court expressed reluctance to upset settled expectations by
creating a new liability. Thus, the Court concluded, the
exercise of judicial power to establish the new liability not only would
be intruding within a field properly within Congress' control and as to a
29. 332 U.S. 301, 313-14 (1947).
30. Id. at 302.
31. Id
32. Id. at 310-11.
33. Id at 311-12.
34. Id at 302, 311-12.
35. Id at312-13.
36. Id. at 313.
37. Id. at 314.
38. Id. For the Federal Medical Care Recovery Act, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2651-2653
(1994 & Supp. V 1999); see also Jeffrey E Ghent, Annotation, Validity and Construction of
Medical CareRecoveryAct (42 USC §§ 2651-2653), Dealing with Third-PartyLiabihy for
Hospital and Medical Care Furnished by United States, 7 ALR FED. 289 (197 1) (analyzing
federal and state cases concerning the Federal Medical Care Recovery Act).
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matter concerning which it has seen fit to take no action.... [But] also
would involve a possible element of surprise, in view of the settled
contrary practice.
These reasons for the Court's holding in Standard Oil are later
employed as justifications for the free public services doctrine, and
Standard Oil is cited by a 1983 case from the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that is itself cited by many courts as the
origin of the doctrine.'0 One should be cautious, however, in relying
too heavily on Standard Oil as precedent for the free public services
doctrine. For one thing, the free public services doctrine's bar on
recovery of government expenditures, including those required to
protect the public or public property from harm, is far more expansive
than Standard Oils specific rejection of reimbursement of healthcare
services and sick pay provided to injured soldiers. For another thing,
there is a certain irony in tracing the free public services doctrine back
to federal common law, because, as we shall see below in Part III,
federal common law is itself the source of several significant
exceptions to the doctrine that are so broad as to make the doctrine
inapplicable in most cases governed by federal common law. 1
C Recovery ofFire Suppression Costs Based on Statute
A third antecedent to the free public services doctrine is cases
concerning government statutory claims against tortfeasors for
recovery of fire suppression costs. While these cases themselves do
not involve common law claims, they are viewed as implying, and
dicta in one of them explicitly states, that government has no common
law right to recover fire suppression costs, and that any such right must
be a product of statutory authorization.
In State v Boston & M Railroao the State of New Hampshire,
the City of Rochester, and the Town of Farmington sued a railroad to
recover the costs of extinguishing a fire set by one of the railroad's
locomotives. 2  The suit was filed pursuant to a statute imposing
absolute liability on railroads to pay the expenses of extinguishing
39. Standard Oi, 332 U.S. at 316.
40. See City of Flagstaffv. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 719 E2d 322, 322-
24 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing Standard Oil, 322 US. at 301). The strength of these justifications
will be considered infi Part V
41. See, e.g., Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191,207 (1967); City
of Evansville v. Ky. Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 E2d 1008, 1017-18 (7th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 130 E2d 308, 310-11 (4th Cir. 1942); United States v.
Ill. Terminal R.L, 501 E Supp. 18, 21 (E.D. Mo. 1980).
42. 105 A.2d 751,752 (N.H. 1954).
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fires caused by them. 3 The trial ended in a jury disagreement
necessitating a new trial, at which point the defendant appealed the
trial court's denial of its motion for a directed verdict, arguing that the
plaintiff's claim lacked sufficient evidence." The New Hampshire
Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, fimding that they had
provided adequate circumstantial evidence to reach the jury, and
remanded the case for a new trial." In an unrelated case, Portsmouth v
Campanella & Card& Construction Co., the New Hampshire Supreme
Court denied the City of Portsmouth, New Hampshire recovery for fire
suppression costs for extinguishment of a brush fire within the city
limits under a statute allowing for municipal recovery of fire
suppression costs related to forest fires.46
Although these cases deal exclusively with statutory claims, both
have been cited in support of the proposition that there is no basis in
common law for government recovery of fire suppression costs." It
seems that the existence of these statutes allowing recovery has been
understood to imply that common law provides no such cause of
action. The statutes in these cases, however, impose liability without
fault and could just as easily be understood to imply that common law
allows only for recovery based on negligence.
In one case dealing with a statutory claim for fire suppression
costs, there at least appears to be dicta supporting the proposition that
the common law provides no cause of action.' In People v Wilson, the
State of California brought a claim for fire suppression costs against a
property owner who negligently set a fire that spread to land owned by
neighboring property owners.' 9 In support of its claim, the State cited
three sections from the California Health and Safety Code providing
that one who negligently sets a fire on or allows a fire to escape from
his property to the property of another is liable both for damages to the
43. Id at 754.
44. The defendants emphasized the absence of eyewitness testimony concerning the
fire's origin and the plaintiffs' failure to present evidence of other fires caused by the railroad
under similar circumstances. Id
45. Id at 755.
46. 123 A.2d 827, 830-31 (N.H. 1956).
47. See, e.g., Allenton Volunteer Fire Dep't v. Soo Line R.R., 372 E Supp. 422, 423
(E.D. Wis. 1974) (citing Campanela, 123 A.2d at 827); Town of Freetown v. New Bedford
Wholesale Tire, Inc., 423 N.E.2d 997, 998 (Mass. 1981) (citing Campanella, 123 A.2d at
827); Town of Howard v. Soo Line R.R., 217 N.W.2d 329, 330 (Wis. 1974) (citing Boston &
M. R.R., 105 A.2d at 751).
48. SeePeople v. Wilson, 49 Cal. Rptr. 792 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
49. Id at 793.
[Vol. 76:727738
FREE PUBLIC SER VICES DOCTRINE
neighboring property and for the expenses of fighting the fire."0 The
Code further specifies that courts are to treat liability for the costs of
fire suppression as a charge to be paid on the same basis as "an
obligation under contract, expressed or implied?
51
The defendant responded by claiming that the State's claim, filed
two years and three months after the incident, was barred by the two-
year statute of limitations on contract actions. 2 The State replied that
its action was governed by the three-year statute of limitations for
actions based on liability created by statute. 3 In support of its position,
the State cited authority to the effect that the three-year statute of
limitations "applies ... where the liability is embodied in a statutory
provision andwas of a type which did not exist at common law." The
California District Court of Appeal held that pursuant to the provisions
of the Health and Safety Code, the State's action should be treated as a
contract action and therefore subject to the two-year statute of
limitations.
In admitting the plausibility of the State's position that the three-
year statute of limitations applied to its claim, the court stated: "No
case has been cited, and we have found none, which permits, in the
absence of a statute, the recovery of fire suppression expenses by one
not protecting his own property. Thus, recovery for fire suppression
expenses by a state or other public agency is a creature of statute' 6
This passage from the opinion has been widely cited by courts
seeking support for the free public services doctrine. 7 While it does
support the doctrine, dicta from this lone intermediate appellate
opinion hardly constitutes the robust precedential foundation that later
courts have made it out to be.
50. Id (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFEY CODE §§ 13,007-13,009 (Deering 2000)).
51. Id (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 13009).
52. Id at 793-94.
53. Id at 794.
54. Id (citing I B.E. WrKN, CALnWORNIA PROCEDURE 654 (1954)).
55. Id
56. Id (citing R.P Davis, Annotation, Vaiidity andApplication of Statutes Imposing
Upon the Owner or Occupant Liabiliy for Expense ofFighting Fire Starting on is Land or
Property, 90 A.L.R.2D 873 (1963) (dealing with the Fireman's Rule)). The aptness of the
Fireman's Rule will be questioned hifia in Part V
57. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 E2d 1077, 1080 (D.C. Cir.
1984); Allenton Volunteer Fire Dep't v. Soo Line R.R., 372 E Supp. 422, 423 (E.D. Wis.
1974); Town of Freetown v. New Bedford Wholesale Tire, Inc., 423 N.E.2d 997, 998 (Mass.
1981); Town of Howard v. Soo Line R.R1, 217 N.W2d 329,330 (Wis. 1974).
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D. TheAppearmce ofa GenemlRule
The free public services doctrine as a general rule barring
recovery of all public service expenditures first appears in Wisconsin
in 1974" and New Jersey in 1976."9 In support of the doctrine, the
Wisconsin cases cite the decisions concerning statutory claims for fire
suppression costs discussed above.' The New Jersey case cites no
authority whatsoever for the doctrine.' The doctrine emerges in other
jurisdictions throughout the 1980s and 1990s in cases citing the
various antecedents that we have examined as well as the Wisconsin
and New Jersey cases from the 1970s. As we have seen, these
antecedents do not provide a solid precedential foundation for such a
sweeping defense against tort liability. Thus, the free public services
doctrine is essentially a judicial creation of the last thirty years.
A typical case involving the doctrine is Distict of Columbia v
Air Floid; hc.6' In that case, a passenger jet, shortly after taking off
from Washington National Airport in a heavy snowstorm, struck the
Rochambeau Bridge and then plunged into the Potomac River, killing
seventy-eight people."' The cost of rescuing survivors, recovering the
bodies of the deceased, and raising the airplane and its contents from
the river exceeded three-quarters of one million dollars. ' The District
of Columbia, alleging negligence, sued the airline for these expenses. 5
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit aftrmed the district court's dismissal of the action based on the
free public services doctrine.' The court held that "public funds
expended in the 'performance of governmental functions such as the
emergency service provided by plaintiff following the crash.., are not
58. Allenton VolunteerFireDep '4372 E Supp. at 423; SooLinRe.P,217 N.W2dat
331.
59. City of Bridgeton v. B.P Oil, Inc. 369 A.2d 49, 54 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1976).
60. See Allenton Volunteer Fire Dep'4 372 E Supp. at 423 (citing Wilson, 49 Cal.
Rptr. at 794; Portsmouth v. Campanella & Cardi Constr. Co., 123 A.2d 827 (N.H. 1956)); Soo
LinekR., 217 N.W2d at 330 (citing Wilson, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 794; State v. Boston & M. R.R.,
105 A.2d 751 (N.H. 1954)).
61. See B. Oil, 369 A.2d at 54-55. The only case cited in the court's discussion of
the free public services doctrine is Amelchenko v Borough ofFreehold, 201 A.2d 726, 731
(N.J. 1964), a case dealing with the doctrine of governmental immunity.
62. 750 E2d at 1077.
63. Id at 1078.
64. Id
65. Id
66. Id at 1086.
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recoverable in tort."'67 The court offered several justifications for the
doctrine which are discussed in detail below in Part V
Before examining justifications for the doctrine, two preliminary
clarifications will be helpful. Part IfI, which follows next, delineates
the scope of the doctrine, pointing out its limitations and introducing
several exceptions to it. Part IV distinguishes the doctrine from related
doctrines with which it is often confused. Part V then examines and
critiques justifications for the doctrine offered by the courts.
]II. SCOPE OF THE DoCTRINE: LIMITATIONSAND EXCEPTIONS
Having examined the origin of the free public services doctrine,
let us now consider its scope. Although the doctrine states broadly
"that public expenditures made in the performance of governmental
functions are not recoverable," ' ' it is subject to several important
limitations and exceptions. For one thing, the doctrine does not bar
recovery of public service expenditures where expressly allowed by
statute. Additionally, federal common law, considered by some courts
as a source for the doctrine, has produced two exceptions to the
doctrine allowing recovery where government services are necessary
to abate a nuisance or to protect public property. These two federal
common law exceptions, if widely adopted by states, would drastically
reduce the impact of the doctrine. Determining the precise contours of
the doctrine is difficult insofar as it is unclear whether particular
jurisdictions acknowledge these exceptions and, if they do, just how
expansively courts would interpret them in particular cases.
A. Statute and Contract
The free public services doctrine does not bar recovery of public
service expenditures where expressly authorized by statute." For
example, legislation in New York authorizes municipalities to recoup
from a tortfeasor the medical benefits and sick pay awarded to a
policeman injured by the tortfeasor. ° Similarly, New Jersey imposes
statutory liability for cleanup costs on those who discharge hazardous
67. Id at 1079 (alteration in original).
68. Koch v. Consol. Edison Co., 468 N.E.2d 1, 8 (N.Y 1984).
69. Id.
70. N.Y. GEt. MuN. LAW § 207(c) (McKinney 2001) (cited in Koch, 468 N.E.2d at
8). For another example, see People v Southern California Edison Co., 128 Cal. Rptr. 697,
704 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (applying California Health and Safety Code provisions allowing
recovery of fire suppression costs from tortfeasors).
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substances into waters within the state.' The doctrine also does not
bar recovery of public service costs where provided for by contract, as
when the government seeks reimbursement for cleanup costs against a
polluter based on a land-use permit conditioned on the payment of
such costs.' Thus, the doctrine is a common law default rule
modifiable by statute or contract.
B. NuisanceAbatement
Under federal common law, the free public services doctrine does
not bar recovery of public service expenditures where government
services are necessary to abate a nuisance. For example, in United
States v illinois Terminal Radroag a federal district court refused to
dismiss a claim by the federal government seeking reimbursement of
the costs of removing from the Illinois river two bridge piers left
behind after the railroad abandoned the bridge. 3 The United States
argued that the piers obstructed river traffic and constituted a public
nuisance, and the court held that "[r]ecent federal court decisions
reflect a growing recognition of suits by government agencies under
federal common law for the abatement of public nuisances ' 4
Similarly, in Ciy of Evansville v Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., a
Kentucky company discharged toxic chemicals into the Ohio River,
from which two Indiana municipalities drew their drinking water. As
a result of the discharge, the municipalities incurred unusual water-
treatment expenses, and they sued the company to recover them.76 In
reversing the district court's dismissal of the action, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the municipal
plaintiffs could recover their water-treatment expenditures under the
"federal common law... of interstate water pollution"
A recent Massachusetts trial court decision offered a state
common law variation of this nuisance abatement exception to the free
public services doctrine. In City ofBoston v Smith & Wesson Corp.,
the City sued gun manufacturers to recover the costs of municipal
services occasioned by gun violence.78 The defendants moved to
71. See Township of Cherry Hill v. Conti Constr. Co., 527 A.2d 921, 922-23 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (discussing the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act).
72. S. Cal. Edison Co. v. United States, 415 E2d 758, 759 (9th Cir. 1969).
73. 501 F Supp. 18, 19 (E.D. Mo. 1980).
74. Id. at21.
75. 604 F2d 1008, 1010 (7th Cir. 1979).
76. Id
77. Id. at 1017-19.
78. No. 199902590, 2000 WL 1473568, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 13, 2000).
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dismiss the claim based on the free public services doctrine. 9 In
denying the motion, the court held that the doctrine barred recovery of
service expenditures occasioned by "discreet" emergencies that the
"municipality reasonably could expect might occur" such as "[f]ires,
fuel spills and ruptured gas mains""0 The doctrine did not apply,
however, to recovery of expenditures resulting from "a repeated course
of conduct causing recurring costs to the municipality."
C Damage to Public Property
While the free public services doctrine bars recovery of public
services expenditures, it does not prevent government from recovering
for damage to public property. Thus, government may recover from
tortfeasors for damage to public lands, buildings, or equipment.
Courts have found it difficult to maintain the distinction between
public funds and these other forms of public property, and in several
federal cases courts have allowed recovery of public service
expenditures that are in some way connected to other forms of public
property damage. For example, at least one court has allowed a
government negligence claim for recovery of public service costs
where the services were necessary to protect government land. In
United States v Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co., a railway company
negligently failed to contain a fire that threatened a nearby national
forest." The United States Forest Service extinguished the fire, and
the United States sued the railway to recover personnel costs and the
value of the equipment destroyed in fighting the fire. 3 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the trial court's
dismissal of the case, holding that the government was entitled to sue
in tort for recovery of public service expenditures "incurred in
attempting to save [public] property.'4
Other courts, characterizing public service costs as economic
losses, have allowed government recovery based on negligence and
strict liability claims when the government can show physical harm to
property. In In re TMILitigatdon, the state of Pennsylvania and local
municipalities near the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant sued the
owner of the plant to recover personnel and equipment costs involved
79. Id at *7.
80. Id at*8.
81. Id
82. 130 E2d 308, 309 (4th Cir. 1942).
83. Id.
84. Id at 310.
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in responding to an accidental release of radioactive gas into the air
that threatened widespread contamination of the area." A federal
district court granted summary judgment against these claims,
characterizing them as purely economic losses, for which no recovery
was available in the absence of personal injury or property damage. 6
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed,
holding that the plaintiffs should have been granted an opportunity to
provide evidence at trial that radioactive material released during the
accident rendered city buildings unsafe and temporarily unusable,
which would constitute property damage based upon which the
plaintiffs could recover resulting economic losses."
The nuisance abatement and property damage exceptions to the
free public services doctrine have the potential to drastically restrict the
doctrine's impact if the exceptions spread from federal to state courts.
Much conduct that occasions public services can be fairly
characterized as a public nuisance and could therefore serve as the
basis for recovery of public service expenditures. For instance, oil
spills could plausibly be construed as public nuisances. Similarly,
many public services traditionally covered by the doctrine involve
protecting public property. For example, fighting a fire usually
involves protecting not only private citizens and their property, but also
public infrastructure, such as streets, utility installations, and trees.
Under Chesapeake, the costs of these services are recoverable, and
under In re TM, even rendering public buildings temporarily unusable
qualifies as property damage." Thus, negligent conduct that rendered
city streets temporarily unusable might also serve as a basis for
recovering public service expenditures as parasitic economic losses.
If widely adopted, these exceptions would reduce the doctrine to
the proposition that public service expenditures are unrecoverable in
tort where they are unrelated to nuisance abatement, public property
damage, or protecting public property. At the present time, the
doctrine's scope in a particular jurisdiction depends greatly upon
whether the courts in that jurisdiction adopt these exceptions and how
extensively they interpret them. I shall argue below that even in its
85. 544 E Supp. 853, 854 (M.D. Pa. 1982), vacated sub nom. Pennsylvania v. Gen.
Pub. Utils. Corp., 710 E2d 117 (3d Cir. 1983).
86. Id. at 856.
87. Pennsylvania v. Gen. Pub. Utils. Corp., 710 E2d 117, 122-23 (3d Cir. 1983); see
also City of Manchester v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 637 F Supp. 646, 649-50 (D.R.I. 1986)
(discussing the relation between property damage and economic loss).
88. United States v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 130 E2d 308, 310-11 (4th Cir.
1942); nre TMJ, 544 E Supp. at 858.
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narrowest form, the doctrine should be eliminated. Before that,
however, further clarification of the doctrine is necessary.
IV DISTINGUISHING THE FREE PUBLIC SERVICES DOCTRINE FROM
REMOTENESS DocTRNES
A clear understanding of the free public services doctrine
requires not only examining the exceptions to it, but also
distinguishing it from other doctrines with which it is often associated.
Courts frequently employ the doctrine in conjunction with these other
doctrines in order to provide multiple grounds for denying recovery.
Thus, in addition to the doctrine's general rule against recovery of
public service expenditures, courts often reject claims based also on
the attenuated relation between government spending and the
tortfeasor's conduct.9 Courts raise this second concern under the
doctrinal categories of standing, proximate cause, and pure economic
loss. These doctrines are sometimes referred to as remoteness
doctrines." As we shall see, these three doctrines are themselves often
functionally equivalent, but all of them are distinct from the free public
services doctrine.9
The free public services doctrine has often been applied in
conjunction with remoteness doctrines in the context of municipal
lawsuits against the gun industry. A brief examination of this litigation
will help clarify the relationship between all of these doctrines. Since
1999, over thirty cities have sued firearms manufacturers to recover
the costs of municipal services rendered in response to gun violence.92
The cities have alleged that this gun violence results from the gun
89. See, e.g., Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 26 Conn. L. Rptr. 39,46 n.7 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1999), affY 780 A.2d 98 (Conn. 2001) (dismissing municipal claim against gun
manufacturers for lack of standing); id. (dismissing same claim based on "general rule
prohibiting recoupment of municipal expenditures") (quoting Koch v. Consol. Edison Co.,
468 N.E.2d 1, 7-8 (N.Y. 1984)); id. at 44 (dismissing same claim based on lack of proximate
cause).
90. See Victor E. Schwartz, The Remoteness Doctrine: A Rational Limit on Tort
Law, 8 CoRNELL J.L. & PUB. Po'y 421,427-30 (1999).
91. Some commentators fail to distinguish properly the free public services doctrine
from remoteness doctrines. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-The Paths of Civil
Litigation, 113 HARV. L. REV 1752, 1762 (2000).
92. See Timothy D. Lytton, Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry A Compamrive
Instftudonal Analysis, 32 CONN. L. Rnv. 1247, 1260 (2000) [hereinafter Lytton, Lawsuits
Against the Gun Industrl; Timothy D. Lytton, Tort Claims Against Gun Manufacturers for
Crime-Related Injuries: DeFming a Suitable Role for the Tort System in Regulating the
Firearms Industry, 65 Mo. L. REv. 1, 54-61 (2000) [hereinafter Lytton, Tort ClaimsAgainst
Gun Manufacturers]. For periodic updates on this litigation, see the GUN INDUSTRY
LrnGATioN REPORTFR, published monthly by Andrews Publications.
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industry's negligent marketing schemes, deceptive sales practices, and
failure to design guns with adequate safety features.93 Courts have
dismissed these suits based on both the free public services doctrine
and on remoteness grounds.
A. Standing
Courts that have dismissed municipal lawsuits against the gun
industry for lack of standing have held that the cities' losses are too far
removed from any alleged wrongdoing by gun makers. 4 These courts
rely on a direct injury test for standing, variations of which are used by
both federal and state courts.95 In order to better understand this test, it
will be helpful to examine briefly some general principles of standing.
Federal courts often begin their standing analysis with Article I
of the United States Constitution. Article I- limits the jurisdiction of
federal courts to "cases" and "controversies?' 96 The United States
Supreme Court has interpreted this as imposing three standing
requirements on plaintiffs:
[T]o satisfy Article HlI's standing requirements, a plaintiff must show
(1) it has suffered an "injury in fact" that is (a) concrete and
particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of
the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that
the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.97
Based on the second requirement, federal courts have held that in order
to have standing, plaintiffs must suffer harm that directly results from a
defendant's wrongdoing.98  Injuries that are too remote are not
sufficient to confer standing.99 Most state courts have a similar direct
injury standing requirement.'
93. See, e.g., Complaint, Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., CV99-036-1279 (filed
Jan. 27, 1999) at 16-42.
94. See, e.g., Gamrn, 26 Conn. L. Rptr. at 41-42.
95. Id at44.
96. U.S. CoNST. art. IH, § 2.
97. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), 528 U.S. 167, 180-81
(2000).
98. There is some disparity among courts as to whether the indirectness of a
plaintiff's injury is relevant to the second prong of the standing rule concerning causation or
the first prong concerning injury in fact. SeeWhite v. Smith & Wesson, 97 E Supp. 2d 816,
824-25 (N.D. Ohio 2000).
99. SeeHolmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258,269 (1992). Courts often
cite three reasons for denying standing to plaintiffs that do not suffer direct harm. First, the
more indirect an injury is, the more difficult it is to determine the amount of the plaintiff's
injury due to the wrongdoing of the defendant, as distinct from other contributing factors. Id.
[Vol. 76:727
FREE PUBLIC SER VICES DOCTRINE
In Ganim v Smith & Wesson Corp., the City of Bridgeport,
Connecticut sued firearms manufacturers to recover the costs of
municipal services associated with gun violence."' The court
dismissed the City's complaint based on the free public services
doctrine and for lack of standing, explaining:
One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he has
... some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right,
title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy ....
[A] plaintiff who complains of harm resulting from misfortune
visited upon a third person is generally held to stand at too remote a
distance to recover .... [S]tanding requires a colorable claim of direct
injury to the complaining party.'02
The court held that the City's claim was for losses that were entirely
derivative of harms suffered by its citizens, and that the city therefore
lacked standing. 3 The G:aniin court also cited the free public services
doctrine as a ground for dismissing the City's claim.'"
While standing analysis and the free public services doctrine may
overlap, as in Ganim, this is not true in all cases. In the Air Florida
case, for example, the District of Columbia had standing to sue based
on damage to the bridge struck by the airplane and the expense of
removing the aircraft from the water, neither of which was derivative
of injury to others. 5 Nevertheless, the free public services doctrine
Second, recognizing claims of indirect injury would require courts to adopt complicated rules
for apportioning damages among plaintiffs at different levels of remove from the initial
wrongful conduct in order to avoid the risk of multiple recoveries for the same conduct. Id.
Third, deterring injurious conduct can be more easily effected by directly injured victims,
who can generally be counted on to bring suit, without the problems of causation and
apportionment attendant to the claims of more remote victims. Seeid at 269-70.
100. See, e.g., Craaim,26 Conn. L. Rptr. at44.
101. Id.at39-40.
102. Id. at 40 (alterations in original) (quotations omitted).
103. Id. at 44-45. State courts in Ohio and Florida have followed the Cranim court in
dismissing municipal lawsuits against gun makers for lack of standing. Penelas v. Arms
Tech., Inc., No. 99-1941CA-06, 1999 WL 1204353, at *2 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 13, 1999), afT'd
on other grounds, 778 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert denied, 799 So. 2d 218 (Fla.
2001); City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., [2000 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep.
(CCH) 15,880, at 55,181 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2000). Other courts, however, have
rejected this comparison and declined to dismiss municipal suits against gun makers for lack
of standing. See, e.g., City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 199902590, 2000 WL
1473568, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 13, 2000), discussed inzr notes 169-171 and
accompanying text.
104. Ganim, 26 Conn. L. Rptr. at 46 n.7 (citing Koch v. Consol. Edison Co., 468
N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 1984)).
105. See750 E2d 1077, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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barred the District from recovering the costs of its rescue operations."°
Thus, the doctrine bars recovery of public service costs even where the
government has standing to sue based on a direct injury.
B. Proximate Cause
Lack of proximate cause is another ground for dismissal that has
been employed in conjunction with the free public services doctrine.
Consider the rejection of another municipal claim against gun makers.
In City of Philadelphia v Beretta USA, Corp., a federal district court
dismissed Philadelphia's negligence claims against the gun industry
based on the free public services doctrine and a finding that the City's
injuries were "too remote from the defendant's alleged wrongful
conduct*'"0 7 In this case, the court framed the issue of remoteness as
one of proximate cause.' 8 While proximate cause, in contrast to
standing, is often treated as a question of fact for the jury, the Beretta
court explained that proximate cause also commonly functions as a
vehicle for limiting liability based on policy considerations provided
by the court.' 9 Thus, the court's treatment of remoteness as a matter of
proximate cause was functionally equivalent to the Ganm court's
treatment of remoteness as matter of standing."' Like the Crdrim
court, the Beretta court also cited the free public services doctrine as a
basis for dismissing the City's claim (the court referred to the doctrine
as the "municipal cost recovery rule")."'
If the policy considerations underlying a court's proximate cause
analysis include the free public services doctrine, then lack of
proximate cause and the doctrine will not only overlap; they will
dictate identical outcomes in nearly all cases. This is, however, often
not the case. Proximate cause analysis usually focuses on the
closeness, in terms of directness or foreseeability, between a
tortfeasor's conduct and a victim's loss. By contrast, the free public
services doctrine excludes recovery based on the type of loss (i.e.,
public service expenditures) regardless of how directly or foreseeably
related to the tortfeasor's conduct. Again, the Air Florida case is
instructive. In that case, no one disputed the airline's liability for the
106. Id. at 1080.
107. 126 E Supp. 2d 882, 894-95 (E.D. Pa. 2000), aff U on other grounds, 277 E3d
415 (3d Cir. 2002).
108. Id at 903.
109. Id
110. Id; Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 26 Conn. L. Rptr. 39, 39-40 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1999), affo 780 A.2d 98 (Conn. 2001).
111. Beretta, 126 R Supp. 2d at 894.
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cost of repairs to the bridge (in fact, this issue was settled by the
parties)."' By contrast, the District was denied recovery for its rescue
and cleanup efforts, which were, if anything, more foreseeable
consequences of the airline's negligently taking off in a heavy
snowstorm than striking a bridge. Thus, the free public services
doctrine bars recovery of public service costs even when they are
proximately caused by negligence.
C Pure Economic Loss
Another doctrine that appears alongside the free public services
doctrine is the rule against recovery for pure economic loss. In another
municipal lawsuit against the gun industry, City of Cincinnati v
Beretta USA. Corp., an Ohio appeals court rejected the City of
Cincinnati's claim "for police, emergency, health, corrections,
prosecution and other services" occasioned by gun violence, holding
that
[t]hese municipal costs are unrecoverable in this case because they are
no more than economic loss, which is defined as "direct, incidental, or
consequential pecuniary loss ... "' Economic loss is not ...
compensable where, as here, the injured party has not separately
suffered from death, physical injury to person, serious emotional
distress, or physical damage to property."'
The court also dismissed the City's claim based on the free public
services doctrine."'
Both the pure economic loss rule and the free public services
doctrine bar recovery based on the type of loss. Indeed, one might be
tempted to interpret the free public services doctrine as no more than a
particular application of the pure economic loss rule."' Public service
expenditures, unrelated to public property damage, could be
characterized as pure economic loss.
There are, however, important differences between the pure
economic loss rule and the free public services doctrine. The two
doctrines are justified by different underlying considerations. The rule
112. See District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1079 n.1 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
113. City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., [2000 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab.
Rep. (CCH) 15,880, at 55,175 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2000) (first alteration in original).
114. Idat55,181.
115. See, e.g., MARc A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES
320 n.5 (7th ed. 2001) (citing Koch as an example of the rule against recovery for pure
economic loss).
2002] 749
TULANE LA WREVIEW
against recovery for pure economic loss seeks to limit liability for
negligent conduct and to prevent the flood of litigation that would
accompany unlimited liability. The rule responds to the same concerns
about remoteness that are addressed by standing and proximate cause
doctrines.' 6  Based on these underlying concerns, courts grant
recovery for economic loss where granting recovery does not threaten
to leave courts without a bright line by which to limit liability or where
the loss is not considered too remote. For example, courts normally
grant recovery for economic loss where plaintiffs can show that it is
related to physical injury or property damage. ' 7 In exceptional cases,
courts have even allowed recovery for pure economic loss that is not
considered too remote from the tortfeasor's conduct.118
If the free public services doctrine were construed as no more
than a particular application of the pure economic loss rule, there
would be good reason to believe that courts would regularly allow
recovery of public service expenditures. Public service expenditures
are a determinate, limited category of economic loss, and allowing
recovery for them would not open the door to unlimited liability or
unleash a flood of claims. Moreover, as we have seen, many public
service expenditures, such as those involved in responding to the Air
Florida crash, are not any more remote than other types of loss for
which recovery is traditionally allowed."9 Finally, the protection of
public property exception to the doctrine in federal common law
recognizes that public service expenditures are often related to actual
or potential damage to public property. Thus, the free public services
doctrine bars recovery of public expenditures that would be allowed
under the pure economic loss rule. This is so because the doctrine is
justified by concerns other than remoteness, examination of which will
be the subject of Part V
116. See Schwartz, supra note 90, at 426-29; see also People Express Airlines, Inc. v.
Consol. Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 109-11 (N.J. 1985) (justifying the rule against recovery for
pure economic loss by the same fear of "mass litigation" and "limitless liability" that
motivate the rules of duty and proximate cause, which serve to limit liability for negligent
conduct).
117. See People Express, 495 A.2d at 109 (discussing the history and basis for the
physical harm rule).
118. Seee.g.,idat 113.
119. See District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1079 n.1 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
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D Subrogatibn
Before turning to justifications for the free public services
doctrine, it may be helpful to distinguish it from one last doctrine:
subrogation. An insurer who suffers pure economic loss in the form of
payments made to an insured injured by a tortfeasor may have a right
to recover this loss from the tortfeasor by subrogation to the rights of
the insured. Subrogation means that the insurer stands in the shoes of
the insured and sues the tortfeasor under claims available to the
insured. This is possible because the insured assigns his right to sue
for his injuries to the insurer. Subrogation may be available by
contract, statute, or common law principles of equity.'
It would be a mistake to view efforts by government entities to
recover public service expenditures as subrogation actions.' First of
all, the government provision of public services to tort victims does not
involve any assignment to the government of the victims' rights to sue
for their injuries. Government claims to recover the cost of these
services have no effect on tort victims' rights. For example, in
municipal lawsuits against the gun industry, claims by cities for the
costs of law enforcement and emergency services do not affect the
rights of gun violence victims to sue for their injuries. Second, in
claims for public service expenditures, government entities sue in their
own right for their own losses, which are distinguishable from the
losses of their citizens. So, in the Air Florida case, the government
sued for the costs of its rescue and cleanup operation, not the injuries
suffered by the passengers. Third, government claims for public
service expenditures are often made in cases where the services were
necessary to prevent injury to citizens, and so there is no possibility of
subrogation to the rights of an injured victim. In Townshp of Cherty
Hill v Conti Constnuctibn Co., the Township of Cherry Hill sued for
the costs of responding to the rupture of a natural gas main caused by
the negligence of a construction company." The expenses sought by
the town were the costs of preventing harm to citizens.'2' Thus, the
120. See Maijie D. Barrows & Susan A. Byron, Subrogation v Contribution: What
in a Na9e. BRIEF, Winter 2001, at 44, 45.
121. Cf Peter Schuck, Smoking Gun Lawsuits: Mass Tort Subrogation May Sound
Like an Obscure and RanFiedLitigation Technique, But It Could Be FarMore Hamzful Than
Tha4 AM. LAW., Sept. 2001, at 81 (asserting that municipal lawsuits against the gun industry
are subrogation actions).
122. 527 A.2d 921, 922 (N.J. Supp. Ct. App. Div. 1987).
123. Id
2002]
TULAAELA WREVIEW
claims to which the free public services doctrine applies do not involve
issues of subrogation.
V A CR1TIQUE OF JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE DocTRINE IN CASE LAW
Case law offers four justifications for the free public services
doctrine. One is doctrinal: it asserts that tortfeasors owe government
entities no duty of care that would support recovery. Two others are
institutional: one claims that courts are preempted from granting
recovery for public service expenditures, and the other asserts that
courts should defer to legislatures in deciding questions of who pays
the costs of public services. A fourth justification for the doctrine
suggests that courts should avoid upsetting settled expectations.
Discussion of the doctrine in case law is rather spare. Most
opinions merely refer to it as a generally accepted rule and cite prior
cases. The few opinions that give justifications provide little more
than merely the outlines of an adequate defense of the doctrine, and
they suffer from question-begging and rely on misplaced arguments
about judicial deference to legislative policy making. Thus, surveying
the case law reveals that in imposing the doctrine, courts have failed to
offer any convincing justification for it.
A. No Duty
Some courts have rejected government negligence claims seeking
to recover public service expenditures on the ground that tortfeasors
owe government entities no duty that would support recovery. In
Mayor & Council ofMorgan City v Jesse J Fontenot Inc., the owners
of an oil transport company and a fuel bulk plant negligently caused a
fire during a fuel delivery.24 In response, the city provided firefighting
and law enforcement services to extinguish the blaze, which destroyed
much of the surrounding area.'" The city sued to recover for damage
to city streets and to its firefighting equipment and for the cost of
overtime pay for its emergency services personnel.' 6 The trial court
rendered a judgment granting the city's claim for damage to the streets
and rejecting the city's claim for damage to equipment and the cost of
services rendered in fighting the fire.27 In affirming the judgment, a
Louisiana appellate court recognized that the defendants "were under a
124. 460 So. 2d 685, 686 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1984).
125. Id.
126. Id at 686-87.
127. Id. at 687.
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duty to carefully handle the combustible and/or flammable liquids in
their control or possession so that an unreasonable risk of harm would
not be created for others?""8 The court held, however, that this duty
"does not include within the ambit of its protection the risk that public
property and funds will be expended to fight a fire caused by a breach
of [the] duty.""89
In finding that the defendants owed the city no duty with regard
to costs associated with providing emergency services, the Fontenot
court compared the city to a professional rescuer.'30 The relevance of
this comparison arises out of a common law doctrine that denies a
firefighter the right to sue an owner or occupier of a premises for any
injury incurred by the firefighter while fighting a fire caused by the
owner/occupier's negligence. 3' The reason for this doctrine, known as
the "fireman's rule" is that courts have traditionally considered
firefighters entering upon land to extinguish a fire to be licensees
rather than invitees, because the firefighters' primary purpose is to
protect the public.' 2 The rule has been extended beyond premises
liability and firefighting to bar recovery by other emergency services
personnel for injuries incurred in the course of rendering assistance
arising out of risks inherent in their professional duties.' This broader
bar to recovery is called the "professional rescuers' doctrine." No
longer grounded in premises liability, the primary rationale for the
doctrine is that professional rescuers are said to assume the risks
inherent in their duties.TM According to the Fontenot court, "[b]y
assuming the responsibility of providing for such 'rescue' services, the
City has placed itself in a situation analogous to that of the
professional rescuer.""' In essence, the court held that cities, as a
128. Id
129. Id. at 688.
130. Id.
131. See Joseph B. Conder, Annotation, Application of 'Firemen 1 Rule" to Bar
Recovery by Emergency Medical Peronnel Injured in Responding to, or at Scene of,
Emergency, 89 A.L.R.4MT 1079 (1991).
132. See Larry D. Scheafer, Annotation, Liability of Owaer or Occupant of Premises
to Firefighter Coming Thereon in Discharge of His Duty, 11 A.L.R.4m 597, 601-02 (1982).
133. SeeConder, supra note 131, at 1081-82.
134. Seeid.
135, 460 So. 2d at 688. At least one commentator has erroneously claimed that the
free public services doctrine is merely another name for the fireman's rule. SeeAndrew S.
Cabana, Comment, Missing the Target-Municipal Litigation Against Handgun
Manufacturers: Abuse of the Civil Tort System, 9 GEO. MASON L. Ray. 1127, 1163 (2001)
(arguing that municipal suits against the gun industry for the costs of emergency services and
law enforcement run "afoul of the municipal cost recovery rule also known as the 'Fireman's
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matter of law, assume the risk of property damage and personnel costs
incurred while providing emergency services, and, for this reason,
tortfeasors owe cities no duty of care with regard to this risk.'36
The Fontenot court's justification of the free public services begs
the question. According to the court, the government cannot recover
the costs of public service expenditures from tortfeasors because
tortfeasors owe the government no duty of care to prevent such
losses."' Tortfeasors owe no duty because the government, like a
professional rescuer, assumes the risk of losses incurred while
providing services to tort victims.'38 The government can be said to
assume this risk because such losses are inherent in the government's
duty to provide public services. That is, the government is under a
duty to provide public services free of charge. Thus, the government
cannot recover the costs of public services from tortfeasors because
they are under a duty to provide such services free of charge. The
Fontenot court's duty analysis ultimately amounts to a restatement,
rather than a justification, of the free public services doctrine: the
government cannot recover public service costs from tortfeasors
because it is under a duty not to.
Duty analysis, if properly developed, might well provide support
for the free public services doctrine. Courts have failed, however, to
offer thoughtful duty analysis when it comes to the free public services
doctrine. A more complete analysis of the obligations of government
to provide public services to tortfeasors free of charge would include
considerations of fairness, deterrence, loss spreading, and the limits of
judicial policy making. I shall argue below in Part VI that these
considerations all weigh against the doctrine.
B. Legislative Preemption
Some courts have cited legislative preemption as a basis for
rejecting government claims for recovery of public service
expenditures. In City ofBidgeton v BP Oil, Inc., a municipality
sued two oil companies to recover costs incurred by the city fire
department in a week-long effort to clean up an oil spill caused by the
Rule'); see also Olson, supra note 2, at 28 (observing that the free public services doctrine is
"doctrinally consistent with the common law bar against recovery by professional rescuers").
136. Fonteno4 460 So. 2d at 688.
137. Id. at 687.
138. Seeidat688.
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defendants.'39 The trial court rejected the City's claim for recovery of
these costs, reasoning:
It has been stated that "It cannot be a tort for government to govern'
Neither is government a saleable commodity. [New Jersey statutory
law] authorizes local government to establish fire departments. While
at one time it was a private function, in 1976 one of governments [sic]
duties is that of fire protection.
Governments, to paraphrase the Declaration of Independence, have
been instituted among men to do for the public good those things which
the people agree are best left to the public sector. Since our country
was founded there has devolved a widening horizon of public activity.
True, certain activities have developed in areas from which revenue has
been derived, such as turnpikes, water or power supply, or postal
services. Nevertheless, there remains an area where the people as a
whole absorb the cost of such services-for example, the prevention
and detection of crime. No one expects the rendering of a bill (other
than a tax bill) if a policeman apprehends a thief. The services of fire
fighters are within this ambit and may not be billed as a public utility.
Thus, if the city were the owner of adjacent land damaged by
escaping oil, it like all landowners, may recover damages caused by this
escape. It cannot, however, recover costs incurred in fire prevention or
extinguishment. That is the very purpose of government for which it
was created.
140
The court here offers a justification for the free public services
doctrine based on preemption: because public services are authorized
by statute, government entities have a duty to provide them free of
charge except where service fees are explicitly contemplated by the
legislature, and this statutory scheme preempts any attempt to charge
tortfeasors for cleaning up oil spills by suing them in common law tort.
This statutory preemption argument applies with special force to
claims by municipalities. Municipal governments are themselves
creations of state legislatures and have no rights except those conferred
by statute.'' In order to recover public service costs from tortfeasors,
cities must find some sort of statutory authorization.
Even so, it is unclear why the B.P Oil court concludes from the
absence of fees in statutes authorizing public services that the
legislature intended the government to provide such services without
139. 369 A.2d 49, 50 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1967).
140. Id. at 54-55 (citation omitted).
141. Note, Recovering the Costs of Public Nuisance Abatement: The Public and
Pivate City Sue the Gun Industry, 113 HARv. L. REV. 1521, 1531 (2000).
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compensation.'4 2 The absence of fees implies only that the legislature
did not wish to charge those who benefit from public services, not that
no one should ever be charged. It might well have intended to leave
intact what it assumed were preexisting governmental rights to recover
the cost of public services from tortfeasors. Such rights might be
implicit in the general powers of the city to sue based on common law
and statutory rights. Indeed, the court admits that the city can, "like all
landowners," sue based on common law rights to recover for damage
to its property without specific statutory authorization.' 3
In cases involving state or federal governmental entities, there is
even less reason to think that the statutory creation of public services
without explicit user fees preempts government cost-recoupment
lawsuits against tortfeasors. Even statutes explicitly creating criminal
penalties without mention of civil penalties have been held not to
preempt civil recovery under common law. In Wyandotte
Ti.nsportation Co. v United States, the federal government sued a
negligent shipping company for costs associated with removing a
sunken vessel from an inland waterway.' The shipping company
objected that the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, making it unlawful
to carelessly sink vessels in navigable channels, imposed only criminal
penalties for its violation and made no mention of any civil cause of
action."' The United States Supreme Court rejected this argument,
holding that "the general rule that the United States may sue to protect
its interests ... is not necessarily inapplicable when the particular
governmental interest sought to be protected is expressed in a statute
carrying [only] criminal penalties for its violation:"'46 By allowing
recovery where neither precluded nor provided for by statute, the Court
seems to imply that recovery of public service expenditures has an
independent basis in common law.
C. Preference forLegislave Decision Making
Aside from arguments about preemption by statute, some courts
have justified the free public services doctrine based on a general
preference for legislative, rather than judicial, policy making. In Ciy
142. SeeB 0il, 369A.2dat54-55.
143. Id at 55.
144. 389 U.S. 191,193 (1967).
145. Id at 198-99.
146. Id at 201-02. For a discussion of the difficulties of interpreting legislative
silence, see John C. Grabow, Congressional Silence and the Search forLegislative Intent: A
Venture into "Speculative Unrealities," 64 B.U. L. REv 737 (1984), and William N. Eskridge,
Jr., InterpretngLegislative Inaction, 87 MIci. L. REv 67 (1988).
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of Flagstaff v Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroa4 four railroad
tank cars carrying liquefied petroleum gas derailed, prompting local
authorities to evacuate areas near the tracks to protect the public from a
possible gas leak or explosion.47 The City of Flagstaff sued the railway
company to recover the expenses incurred in the evacuation.' 0 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirtmed a
summary judgment against the City, holding that "the cost of public
services for protection from fire or safety hazards is to be borne by the
public as a whole, not assessed against the tortfeasor whose negligence
creates the need for the service" 9 The court explained:
Here governmental entities themselves currently bear the cost in
question, and they have taken no action to shift it elsewhere. If the
government has chosen to bear the cost for reasons of economic
efficiency, or even as a subsidy to the citizens and their business, the
decision implicates fiscal policy; the legislature and its public
deliberative processes, rather than the court, is the appropriate forum to
address such fiscal concerns.150
The court here construes the question of the defendant's liability in tort
as a question of fiscal policy that is better handled by the legislature.
There are two problems with the Atchison court's approach.
First, it assumes that the legislature, by remaining silent, made a
conscious choice to affirm the status quo-i.e., that the city has no
right to recover public service costs from tortfeasors.'5' Even if one
grants the assumption that the legislature's silence amounts to an
affirmation of the status quo, there is no reason to believe that the
status quo is that the city has no right to recover. Indeed, whether the
city has such a right in the first place is precisely the question on
appeal!
Second, and more importantly, if the court's concern is really that
the issue be settled by the legislature's "public deliberative process,"
then the court would do better to grant recovery, leaving the legislature
to overturn its holding.52 The free public services doctrine, by
shielding tortfeasors from liability for the cleanup costs of their
misconduct, functions in cases like Atchison as a subsidy to industrial
polluters. This type of subsidy, resulting from a little-known defense
147. 719 E2d 322, 323 (9th Cir. 1983).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 324.
151. See id.
152. See id.
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against liability, is, contrary to the court's implication, unlikely to be
the product of any public or deliberative process.' 3
Anticipating this second objection, the court asserts that the
legislature's failure to explicitly overturn the doctrine amounts to an
endorsement of it.'54 According to the court, the legislature is well
aware of the doctrine and its effects: "We doubt judicial intervention is
needed to call the attention of Arizona's legislative authorities to the
cost allocation presented by what we find to be the existing rule, for
the state and its municipalities presently feel the pinch when they pay
the bill?"55  This observation, however, merely points out that
municipal officials and state legislatures are likely to be aware of the
subsidy, not that they have approved of it through a public deliberative
process. The court is right that such a subsidy should be subject to
public deliberation, but the burden of convincing the legislature to
grant such a subsidy should fall on the beneficiaries of it, as it does
with most other subsidies. In the case of the free public services
doctrine, these beneficiaries include large business interests who have
the financial and lobbying resources to mobilize, raise the issue
publicly, and promote legislative consideration of it.' 6
D Protecting Settled Expectatons
The traditional reluctance of courts to upset settled public
expectations is another argument for the free public services doctrine.
As the B.? Oil court put it, "No one expects the rendering of a bill
(other than a tax bill) if a policeman apprehends a thief."' 7 As the
Atchison court stated, "Expectations of both business entities and
individuals, as well as their insurers, would be upset substantially were
we to adopt the rule proposed by the city."'' 5 It is unclear, however,
whether liability in these cases would really upset commercial
expectations, given that tortfeasors face liability if the same conduct
harms private parties. As the Atchison court admitted, "the tortfeasor
is fully aware that private parties injured by its conduct, who cannot
spread their risk to the general public, will have a cause of action
153. Secid.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. On interest group politics and the legislative process, see NEIL K. KOMESAR,
IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITrTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY
53-97 (1994) and PETER H. ScHucK, THE LIMITS OF LAW: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNANCE 204-50 (2000).
157. 369A.2d 49, 54 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976).
158. 719E2dat323.
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against it for damages proximately or legally caused" '59 Furthermore,
broad exceptions to the doctrine for nuisance claims and protection of
public property introduce enough uncertainty that it is unclear whether
individuals and business entities do, in fact, rely on it.60
An additional question, aside from whether individuals and
business entities expect free public services, is whether such
expectations are legitimate. Keep in mind that the business entities in
B. Oil and Atchison expected free services not merely for routine
needs such as police protection, but for cleaning up large-scale toxic
chemical spills due to their negligence.' Whether the law should
protect tortfeasors' expectations of free public services depends, in
part, on whether this makes for good public policy. Part VI provides
reasons to believe that it does not.
VI. OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRiNE
As the previous discussion has revealed, the free public services
doctrine is a recent judicial invention that lacks a solid precedential
foundation. Furthermore, the justifications for it that courts have
provided amount to little more than question begging and pro-industry
bias. This part of the Article goes beyond the case law and raises
objections to the doctrine based on fairness, efficiency, and
institutional concerns.
A. Fairness
The free public services doctrine is unfair in two ways. First, it
unjustifiably favors tortfeasors who harm government as compared to
those who harm private parties. Second, it imposes the losses caused
by this favored class of tortfeasors on taxpayers. In many instances,
the doctrine lets industrial tortfeasors off of the hook for forest fires,
oil spills, and airline crashes and makes taxpayers pay the cleanup
costs.'62
159. Id.
160. It is difficult to do more than speculate with regard to whether companies insure
against the risk of paying for public services occasioned by their negligence because
companies do not make this information available to the public.
161. SeeAtchison, 719 E2dat323; B.T? Oil, 369A.2dat50.
162. See, e.g., InreOil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz, 954 E2d 1279, 1310 (7th Cir. 1992)
(oil spill); District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 E2d 1077, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (airline
crash); Town of Freetown v. New Bedford Wholesale Tire, Inc., 423 N.E.2d 997, 998 (Mass.
1981) (fire).
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1. Favoring Tortfeasors Who Cause Loss to Government
The free public services doctrine unfairly favors tortfeasors who
harm government over those who harm private parties. For example, if
an oil tanker negligently spills oil near a coast and the local
municipality cleans it up, according to the free public services
doctrine, the owner of the tanker is not liable in tort for the cleanup
costs.' If, however, a private party, seeking to avoid damage to his
private beach, cleans up the same oil spill, the free public services
doctrine does not apply and the tanker owner is liable. " Case law
concerning the doctrine provides no adequate justification for this
favorable treatment of tortfeasors who harm government. Looking
beyond existing case law, one might attempt to identify some reason
that harming government, in contrast to harming a private party,
should not give rise to liability.
Perhaps the distinction rests on the nature of government as a tort
plaintiff. One might consider wrongdoing that harms only government
as, in some sense, victimless. It is basic to the law of torts that persons
whose wrongdoing harms no one are relieved of liability even if they
would have been liable had their wrongdoing harmed someone. As an
old common law dictum puts it, "Proof of negligence in the air, so to
speak, will not do."' Tort liability attaches only where the defendant's
carelessness finds a victim.' 6 This argument, however, ignores the fact
that whenever government is forced to expend resources on public
services, taxpayers and the public at large suffer losses. Taxpayers lose
when they pay to replenish public resources depleted by the tortfeasor,
and the public at large loses whenever those resources are no longer
available for other purposes. In this regard, government is analogous
to a corporation, whose losses ultimately harm shareholders. Although
government entities are not natural persons, they can, like private
corporations, nevertheless be tort victims.
It is also possible that the distinction between government and
private parties rests on the type of loss that each incurs. Perhaps public
service expenditures ought to be, for some reason, unrecoverable.
Maybe they should be unrecoverable because they are too remote.
163. See, e.g., Kodiak Island Borough v. Exxon Corp., 991 P.2d 757, 760-61 (Alaska
1999).
164. See United States v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 130 E2d 308, 310 (4th Cir.
1942) (citing cases permitting private individual "recovery of damages in the form of
expenditures incurred in attempting to save property").
165. Palsgrafv. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99,99 (N.Y. 1928).
166. Seeid
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Contrary to the distinction between the free public services doctrine
and remoteness doctrines set forth above in Part IV, maybe the free
public services doctrine ultimately relies on the concept of remoteness.
One way to express this would be to assert that public service
costs are pure economic losses, and, as such, are not recoverable in
negligence actions. 6' The problem with this suggestion is that it fails
to explain the favorable treatment accorded to tortfeasors who harm
government rather than private parties. For example, in our offshore
oil spill example, the free public services doctrine bars recovery of
cleanup costs when incurred by government but does not block
recovery of the same costs when incurred by a private party. As far as
the pure economic loss rule is concerned, these losses are identical,
and the rule provides no justification for treating them differently.
An alternative way to express the idea that public service costs
are too remote is to argue that government losses, unlike private party
losses, are entirely derivative of harms suffered by citizens. In essence,
the government lacks standing to sue tortfeasors for the cost of public
services because the need for these services does not result directly
from the tortfeasor's wrongdoing, but rather is a consequence of more
direct harms to citizens. There are several problems with this
suggestion. First of all, government sometimes provides public
services in the absence of any harm to citizens, as when it cleans up oil
spills." The costs of these services are neither remote nor derivative
of harms to others.
Second, even public services associated with harm to citizens
may not be derivative of harm to citizens. For example, government
often provides services to prevent future harm that, while associated
with past harms to citizens, do not derive from a discrete harm to a
particular citizen. In City of Boston v Smith & Wesson Corp., the
City of Boston sued the gun industry to recover the cost of city
services associated with gun violence. 9 In response, the defendants
moved to dismiss the suit for lack of standing, arguing that the City's
losses were entirely derivative of harms to its citizens.' In rejecting
the motion, the trial court held that the City's harm
167. This theory was raised and rejected in City of Manchester v National Gypsum
Co., 637 E Supp. 646, 649 (D.R.I. 1986). See also McIntyre, supmnote 14, at 1016.
168. See, e.g., Exxon, 991 P.2d at 759; City ofBridgeton v. B.P Oil, Inc., 369 A.2d 49,
50 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976).
169. No. 199902590, 2000 WL 1473568, at *1-*3 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 13,2000).
170. Id.at*10.
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is in large part not "wholly derivative of" or "purely contingent on"
harm to third parties .... [H]arm to Plaintiffs may exist even if no third
party is harmed. For example, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants'
conduct places firearms in the hands of juveniles causing Plaintiffs to
incur increased costs to provide more security at Boston public schools.
Thus, wholly apart from any harm to the juvenile (who may even
believe himself to be benefited by acquisition of a firearm), and
regardless whether any firearm is actually discharged at a school, to
ensure school safety Plaintiffs sustain injury to respond to Defendants'
conduct. Even if no individual is harmed, Plaintiffs sustain many of the
damages they allege due to the alleged conduct of Defendants fueling
an illicit market (e.g., costs for law enforcement, increased security,
prison expenses and youth intervention services).17" '
Thus, while costs like increased school security are associated with
gun violence suffered by citizens, these costs do not derive from any
particular gun violence injury.
Third, even public service costs incurred while assisting injured
citizens should not be characterized as wholly derivative and therefore
unrecoverable for lack of standing. Such a move would be inconsistent
with the treatment of private individuals who assist tort victims. Most
states allow private rescuers to sue tortfeasors for injuries and property
damage suffered in the course of rendering assistance.'72 While it is
true that they do not allow recovery for rescuers' out-of-pocket losses
nor for the injuries or the property damage of professional rescuers,
these claims are not barred for lack of standing.'73 To clarify, this is not
to say that government ought to be treated as a rescuer for the purpose
of determining tortfeasor liability for public service expenditures, but
only that for the purposes of standing analysis, government expenses
in rendering emergency assistance to tort victims are no more
derivative than losses borne by private and professional rescuers.
171. Id at *6; cf City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A., Corp., 126 E Supp. 2d 822,
897-98 (E.D. Pa. 2000), affUdon other grounds, 277 F.3d 415 (3d Cir. 2002); Ganim v. Smith
& Wesson Corp., 26 Conn. L. Rptr. 39, 44-45 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999), affg 780 A.2d 98
(Conn. 2001).
172. See W PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTs 307-08
(5th ed. 1984) (discussing the rescue doctrine); Jeffrey G. Ghent, Annotation, Rescue
Doctrine: Liability of One Who Negligently Causes Motor Vehicle Accident for Injuries to
Person SubsequentlyAttempting to Rescue Persons or Property, 73 A.L.R.4TH 737 (1989);
Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Liability of One NegJ'genty Causing Fire for njuries Sustained
by Person Other than Firefighterin Attempt to Control Fire or to Save Life or Property, 91
A.L.R.3D 1202 (1979).
173. See Conder, supra note 131, at 1081 (discussing the professional rescuers'
doctrine).
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Some types of government assistance to injured citizens, for
example, rehabilitation or long-term care, are provided long after the
injury occurs. These less immediate forms of government assistance
do seem more remote than emergency services. Should courts wish to
reject government claims for these types of costs, they should do so
based on remoteness analysis, whether in terms of standing, proximate
cause, or pure economic loss, that is focused on the particularities of
these types of costs, not based on a broad assertion that all government
losses sustained in providing public service are wholly derivative of
harm to citizens. 74
Thus, the concept of remoteness cannot justify the free public
services doctrine. And to be fair, the courts have never said that it
could. As the Atchison court reasoned, "it is the identity of the
claimant and the nature of the cost that combine to deny recovery, not
some concept of remoteness"' 75 The courts have gotten it wrong,
however, in failing to see that not even the identity of the claimant nor
the nature of the cost justifies this doctrine: it is unfair to single out
government claimants or public services costs for unfavorable
treatment in the courts.
2. Imposing an Unfair Loss-Spreading Scheme on Taxpayers
The free public services doctrine spreads government losses
occasioned by tortfeasors among all taxpayers. It functions as a type
of liability insurance. While loss spreading is a widely recognized
function of the tort system, the insurance scheme created by the free
public services doctrine is unfair because, unlike most insurance
schemes, it is involuntary and it allocates to tortfeasors more than their
fair share of risk reduction.
Loss spreading elsewhere in the law of torts involves voluntary
participation of those in the risk pool. For example, when courts
impose liability for product defects, they regularly cite loss spreading
as a justification.'76 Courts view the tort system as an insurance
scheme in which manufacturers pass on the cost of injuries caused by
product defects to their consumers. While the law compels
manufacturers to administer this scheme, consumers-the members of
the insurance pool-voluntarily join it when they choose to purchase
174. For further discussion of healthcare cost-recoupment claims, see hifia-Part VII.C.
175. 719 F.2d 322,324(9th Cir. 1983).
176. For two classic examples, see Heningsen v BloomfiTeldMotors, Inc., 161 A.2d
69, 81 (N.J. 1960), and Greenman v Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal.
1962) (en banc).
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the product. While most consumers may not consciously make this
choice, the cost of purchasing the insurance is included in the price of
the product, and, at the very least, they are free to opt out of the
scheme by not purchasing the product. By contrast, when government
passes public service costs on to taxpayers, they are not free to opt out
of the insurance scheme. As long as government finances public
services, the free public services doctrine will compel taxpayers to
participate in a loss-spreading scheme that insures against liability for
the cost of public services.
Not only is the free public services insurance scheme involuntary,
it is also distributively unfair. The distributive fairness of risk pools
can be analyzed by considering the ratio of the premium that each
member of the pool pays to the level of risk reduction that he receives
(in the form of potential coverage). While risk pools rarely in practice
afford all members an equal premium-to-risk-reduction ratio, we might
wish to consider them fair for practical purposes where the ratios are
roughly equal, either because everyone pays equally and faces similar
risks or because premiums are adjusted in accordance with the risk
posed by each member. There is no such relation between taxes and
risk reduction in the free public services doctrine insurance scheme.
On the premium side, the premiums that taxpayers pay vary in
accordance with their income and property (depending on how taxes
are assessed). On the risk-reduction side, the level of risk that average
citizens pose, and therefore the level of risk reduction that they receive,
is, in most cases, much lower than that of most industrial members of
the risk pool. Thus, industry tends to get far more risk reduction and
pay proportionally less for it than average citizens. That is, citizens are
cross-subsidizing industry.'
In response to this charge of distributive unfairness, one might
point out the many ways in which industry cross-subsidizes citizens.
For example, industry pays school taxes that disproportionately benefit
individual taxpayers with school-age children. Similarly, industry
taxes support public assistance that disproportionately benefits the
177. For a discussion of cross-subsidization in insurance markets, see Jon D. Hanson
& Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party Insurance Exterality: An Economic Justiication for
Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 139 (1990). One vay to address this inequity
is to set premiums based on risk, that is, to adjust tax rates to reflect the level of risk posed by
taxpayers. See Hanson & Logue, supra, at 146-48; infia Part VI.B. Empirical data
comparing public expenditures occasioned by industry to public expenditures occasioned by
individuals is unavailable. Thus, claims of cross-subsidization are admittedly speculative.
Such claims are, however, not unlikely given the relatively higher risk posed by industrial
accidents when compared to accidents caused by individuals.
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poor. While it is true that industrial taxpayers cross-subsidize
individual taxpayers in these ways, these examples of cross-
subsidization are products of legislative decisions, not tort subsidies
created by common law judges. While the tax system's cross-
subsidization of citizens by industry may be just as distributively unfair
as the free public services doctrine's cross-subsidization of industry by
citizens, the former, as a product of the legislative process, enjoys a
level of democratic legitimacy that the latter lacks.
Despite the lack of choice and the lack of distributive equity in
the free public services doctrine insurance scheme, we might wish to
consider it fair if it would be chosen by individuals, were they given
the opportunity to choose.' Were it the case that each individual had
no way of reliably predicting who, including himself, would be a high-
risk or low-risk member of the pool, individuals might choose to join
the scheme despite its distributive inequalities.' 9 Not even this
condition, however, applies to the free public services doctrine
insurance scheme because ordinary citizens can predict reliably that
industrial members of the scheme will generally be high-risk
members.
Given these difficulties, it would be fairer to abandon the free
public services doctrine insurance scheme altogether, thereby
encouraging potential tortfeasors to purchase private liability insurance
that covers public service costs. Getting rid of the doctrine would
replace an involuntary insurance scheme with a voluntary one.
Industry would pass on the cost of private insurance to consumers,
who, through their consumption choices, could choose to join or opt
out of the loss-spreading scheme. And private insurers would adjust
premiums to reflect risk.
B. Efficiency: Deterrence and lnsurance Considerations
Aside from being unfair, the free public services doctrine is an
inefficient way to provide insurance. Eliminating the doctrine would
encourage most high-risk entities to purchase private insurance. This
178. For an example of such a theory of fairness based on hypothetical rational choice,
see generally JOHN RAvLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). For an application of such a theory
to tort law, see Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical
Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 357-60 (1988) (developing a "consumer sovereignty norm"
based on a Rawlsian conception of hypothetical rational choice).
179. SeeRAwLs, supra note 178, at 136 (discussing rational choices "behind a veil of
ignorance").
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would be preferable from the perspectives of both optimal deterrence
and efficient loss spreading.
Insurance coverage carries with it the danger of underinvestment
in safety.'80 When insurance premiums fail to reflect the level of risk
posed by each insured's activities, insureds will not fully internalize
expected accident costs and will not invest efficiently in accident
prevention. Tax rates based on income or property values, which
function as insurance premiums against liability for public service
costs, will give rise to underinvestment in safety. Because there is no
relation between the tax rates of individuals and corporations and the
costs of the public services that their activities occasion, they will fail
to take these costs into account when determining how much to invest
in accident prevention. While ordinary citizens are unlikely to make
such self-conscious calculations with a high degree of detail, industrial
entities commonly undertake this type of risk assessment.'8' Thus, the
free public services doctrine will cause underinvestment in safety by
industry.
Legislatures could address the problem of underinvestment in
safety by adjusting tax rates to reflect risk. It is doubtful, however, that
legislatures are well equipped to perform this kind of comprehensive
risk assessment with the required level of accuracy. Furthermore,
adjusting tax rates to reflect risk would entail a major reorientation of
tax policy because tax rates are currently set based on income and
wealth in order to serve various redistributive purposes.
Instead, the free public services insurance scheme should be
abandoned in order to encourage the purchase of private liability
insurance. By eliminating the free public services doctrine, potential
tortfeasors would have incentive to purchase private liability insurance
that covers the cost of public services. This change could easily be
effected by judicial action, and private insurance carriers are well
equipped to step in and set premiums that more accurately reflect risk.
Private carriers have long been in the business of setting premiums,
they have special expertise, and they have profit incentives to achieve a
high degree of accuracy. While private carriers cannot eliminate the
problem of underinvestment in safety, they can do a better job of
mitigating it than either the current regime or legislative substitutes.
180. See Hanson & Logue, supm note 177, at 138 (discussing the phenomenon of
moral hazard).
181. See Howard A. Latin, Problem-SolvingBehavioraad Theories of Tort Liability,
73 CAL. L. REV. 677, 693-96 (1985) (arguing that commercial enterprises pay more attention
to risk than ordinary individuals).
[Vol. 76:727
FREE PUBLIC SER VICES DOCTRfINE
C Institutional Concerns: The Limits ofJudicial Pol'cy Maing
It is a common refrain in judicial opinions denying relief that the
job of courts is to resolve controversies, not to make public policy.'
However, common law adjudication often influences public policy, and
in areas such as products liability, it does so with a great deal of self-
consciousness.' I have argued elsewhere that courts should play a
limited, complementary role in shaping public policy, working to
support the efforts of legislatures and administrative agencies.' The
free public services doctrine is an example of common law
adjudication that exceeds the proper limits of judicial policy making.
Judicial policy making is well accepted where it is grounded in
common law tradition, complements the efforts of legislatures and
administrative agencies, and does not require courts to engage in
complex statistical analysis.' For example, limiting the scope of
liability by means of duty or proximate cause analysis involves just this
kind of policy making.' 6 By contrast, the free public services doctrine
creates an insurance scheme that subsidizes insurance for high-risk
industrial operations in a way that is not characteristic of the common
law, that was created without any legislative guidance, and that fails to
take into account complex efficiency concerns about which the court
has no information. It is a great irony that courts have attempted to
justify this doctrine-a clear example of judicial legislation-based on
arguments about the superiority of legislative over judicial policy
making.187
182. See, e.g., Lytton, Tort Claims Against Gun Manufacturers, supra note 92, at 50
(citing cases denying claims against gun manufacturers on the ground that it is inappropriate
for courts to attempt to influence gun control policy); see also Anne Giddings Kimball &
Sarah L. Olson, Municipa1Firearm Linigat'on: Ili Conceived fiom AnyAngle, 32 CoNN. L.
REV. 1277, 1302-03 (2000) (arguing that courts should limit themselves to resolving
individual disputes and should not engage in policy making); Peter H. Schuck, The New
Judlcia Ideology of Tort Law, in NEv DIREcTONS IN LIABILrrY LAW 4 (Walter Olson ed.,
1988) (criticizing the policy-making activities of courts).
183. See, eg., Carl T. Bogus, War on the Common Law: The S vggle at the Center of
Products Liability, 60 Mo. L. REV. 1, 65 (1995); Edmund Ursin, Judicia Creadt"z and Tort
Law, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 229, 287-304 (1981).
184. Lytton, Tort ClaimsAgainst Gun Manufacturers, supra note 92, at 50-52.
185. See Bogus, supra note 183, at 65-66 (discussing the tradition of policy making by
common law courts); Lytton, Tort ClaimsAgainst Gun Manufacturers, supra note 92, at 50-
52 (advocating a complementary role for courts in policy making); Shuck, supra note 182, at
15-16 (asserting that common law courts lack the capacity for complex policy analysis).
186. For a recent example, see Hamilton v Beretta USA. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055,
1061-64 (N.Y. 2001), for an analysis of the question of whether gun manufacturers owe the
public a duty of care in how they market and distribute their products.
187. See discussion, supra Part VB-D.
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Eliminating the free public services doctrine will compel legis-
latures to be explicit about subsidizing public services occasioned by
certain tortfeasors. If the legislature wishes to subsidize the cleanup
costs of oil spills in order to support the oil industry, then it should do
so through open deliberation, subject to public scrutiny. Special
industrial subsidies provided by the free public services doctrine ought
to be created by legislatures, not common law courts.
VII. THE IMPLICATIONS OF ELIMINATING THE FREE PUBLIC SERVICES
DocTRINE
Having considered objections to the free public services doctrine,
we now examine the implications of eliminating it. Getting rid of the
doctrine would allow government entities to recover from tortfeasors
the costs of services such as fire suppression, environmental cleanup,
and rescue operations. It is against recovery of these types of
expenditures that the doctrine has most often been deployed.
Eliminating the doctrine would not, however, open the way to
recoupment of all types of public service expenditures. As we have
seen in our discussion of remoteness doctrines, there are other
obstacles besides the free public services doctrine to recovery of
certain types of public service expenditures. For example, even
without the doctrine, courts could decide to bar government claims for
certain healthcare services provided to tort victims. Where the
services are rendered long after the victim was injured, this type of
claim might be dismissed for lack of standing, lack of proximate
cause, or based on the rule against recovery for pure economic loss.'8
Thus, eliminating the free public services doctrine would not subject
tortfeasors to limitless liability, nor is it likely to unleash a flood of
government cost-recoupment litigation.
Aside from the implications for cost-recoupment litigation,
eliminating the doctrine may also have implications for the way we
view government. When we characterize government services as free
and the government as an inexhaustible service provider, we fail to
appreciate that ultimately we, as taxpayers, are paying for public
services and that government expenditures occasioned by tortfeasors
are our losses. By holding tortfeasors accountable for these losses, we
might come to feel more of a personal stake in government and a
greater sense of ownership of its resources.
188. This is assuming, of course, that no statutory basis for recovery exists. Seesupm
notes 163-175 and accompanying text.
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A. Fire Suppression, EnFironmental Cleanup, andRescue
Operations
Eliminating the free public services doctrine would make it
possible for government to recover the costs of what we might call
containment, cleanup, and rescue services. Containment includes fire
suppression' and riot control.'" Examples of cleanup are mopping up
oil spills 9. and removing fallen power lines.'92 Rescue refers to
activities such as removing crash survivors from danger and
administering immediate medical aid.'93 These categories are not
mutually exclusive-different services may fall into more than one
category. For example, cleanup of a toxic spill might also be
characterized as containment. What is important for our purposes,
however, is not the distinction between the categories, but what they
have in common.
Containment, cleanup, and rescue services share two features that
are especially relevant to our discussion. First, all of them protect the
private interests of citizens or the private property interests of the
government. Second, all of them are closely linked to preventing or
mitigating injury to persons or property. As we shall see in the
following sections, if either of these features is missing, then even in
the absence of the free public services doctrine, recovery for the costs
of a service will not be available. If the service is not related to
protecting private interests, then tort law-which is private law-will
not provide a cause of action that would support recovery. Similarly, if
the service is not closely linked to preventing or mitigating injury,
recovery will be blocked by remoteness. Thus, even without the
doctrine, many types of public service expenditures will not be
recoverable.
It is also worth noting that recovery for many types of public
service expenditures might be possible even without eliminating the
doctrine. Insofar as containment and cleanup services are required to
protect public property or abate a public nuisance, recovery could in
theory be available under existing federal common law exceptions to
189. See, e.g., Town of Howard v. Soo Line R.R., 217 N.W.2d 329,330 (Wis. 1974).
190. See, e.g., Koch v. Consol. Edison Co., 468 N.E. 2d 1, 3 (N.Y. 1984).
191. See, e.g., City of Bridgeton v. B.P. Oil Co., 369 A.2d 49, 50 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1976).
192. See, e.g., State v. Long Island Lighting Co., 493 N.Y.S.2d 255, 256 (Nassau
County Ct. 1985).
193. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Fla. Air, Inc., 750 E2d 1077, 1079 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
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the doctrine.'94 In practice, however, even many federal courts have
refused to interpret these exceptions broadly enough to cover the costs
of containment and cleanup services. " Moreover, retaining the
doctrine with these exceptions would still obstruct recovery for rescue
services in a way that, as we saw above in Part VI, is unfair, inefficient,
and inappropriate from an institutional perspective.
B. Thc Liability of Criminals forLawEnforcementExpenadtures
The prospect of eliminating the free public services doctrine
raises concerns about encouraging the government to behave like a
money-minded plaintiff, filing tort claims against ordinary citizens for
the expense of cleaning up litter or writing parking tickets and suing
criminals for the costs of their apprehension, prosecution, and
incarceration. The practice in China of billing the families of executed
criminals for the cost of firing-squad bullets is a gruesome example of
what happens when one mixes service fees with law enforcement.'96
While these concerns are legitimate, panic is unwarranted. Even
in the absence of the free public services doctrine, most types of law
enforcement expenditures would remain unrecoverable. Government
could recover only those law enforcement expenditures related to
containment, cleanup, or rescue. For example, government could
recover the costs of riot control necessitated by a tortfeasor's
negligence'97 or the expenses of evacuating the area around a toxic
spill.'99 By contrast, government could not recover law enforcement
expenses that are closely bound up with its interest in maintaining
public authority and are not primarily directed at protecting private
interests with which tort law is concerned. As the Cobb case
illustrates, recovery for the costs of recapturing an escaped convict is
not available in tort, because in such a case, violation of the law
involves no violation of a private right-neither the state's nor anyone
else's-which could serve as the basis for a tort claim." Similarly,
194. See supm Part HI.B-C.
195. See, e.g., A.rFla., Inc., 750 E2d at 1080; City of Flagstaff v. Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Ry. Co., 719 F.2d 322, 323 (9th Cir. 1983).
196. See Nicholas D. Kristof, Law and Order in China Means More Executions, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 15, 1991, atA2.
197. See, for example, Koch, 468 N.E.2d at 1, 3, in which the police were necessary to
control the threat of rioting during a New York City blackout that was caused by a utility
company's gross negligence.
198. See, for example, Atchison, 719 E2d at 323, in which police services were
necessary to evacuate the site of a petroleum spill caused by a railroad's negligence.
199. For a discussion of State Mighway & Public Works Commission v Cobb, 2
S.E.2d 565, 567 (N.C. 1939), see supra Part lI.A.
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remoteness considerations would bar recovery for the costs of public
services not closely linked to preventing or mitigating harm to private
interests. The costs of criminal prosecution and punishment, for
example, are too remote from particular actual or potential private
rights violations to support recovery in tort. These two boundaries-
one between public and private interests and the other between remote
and proximate relation to injury-are not simple to apply, and in many
cases they would introduce significant ambiguity. For example,
recovery of government expenses related to an arrest for criminal
battery would require consideration of whether the arrest was primarily
directed at protecting the battery victim's rights and whether it was
closely linked to mitigating harm to the victim or protecting the victim
from further harm. This kind of ambiguity, however, is typical of
many doctrinal limits on tort liability, the most notorious being duty
and proximate cause. Even the seemingly clearest rules give rise to
ambiguities that courts must clarify, and resolving borderline cases is
what common law adjudication is all about.
C RecoupmentofHealthcare Costs
Whether eliminating the free public services doctrine would clear
the way for government recoupment of healthcare costs occasioned by
tortfeasors is uncertain for two reasons. First, it is possible that the
doctrine does not apply to claims for healthcare costs, in which case,
its elimination would have no effect on such claims in the future.
Second, even if the doctrine does currently apply to claims for
healthcare costs, it is possible that other obstacles to recovery-for
example, remoteness considerations-would block these claims in the
future so that elimination of the doctrine will still have no practical
effect.
One place to look for clues as to how elimination of the doctrine
would affect claims for recoupment of healthcare costs is state claims
against the tobacco industry. In these claims, states sought recoupment
of healthcare costs occasioned by tobacco-related illness.2" Curiously,
the free public services doctrine was not an issue in these cases. There
200. For a general introduction to tobacco litigation, see Robert L. Rabin, Institutional
and Historical Perspectives on Tobacco Tort Liability, in SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLmcS,
AND CULTuRE 110 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 1993). On claims by state
attorneys general, see generally Wendy E. Wagner, Rough Justice and theAttorney General
Litigaton, 33 GA. L. REv. 935, 935-77 (1999), and Lynn Mather, Theorizing about Tial
Courts: Lawyeris Policymaking, and Tobacco Ligaton, 23 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 897, 897-
940 (1998).
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are several possible reasons for the doctrine's absence. One reason
might be that all of the cases were settled relatively early in the
litigation process, and so the doctrine simply never came up."' A
second reason might be that many states based their claims on
statutory provisions. 2 A third reason might be that the litigants and
the courts did not consider the doctrine relevant because they did not
consider healthcare payments to be services.0 3
Even more intriguing than the absence of discussion about the
free public services doctrine, however, was the recognition in one case
of a common law right of states to sue for healthcare costs occasioned
by tortfeasors, which seems to contradict the doctrine."° In State v
American Tobacco Co., the State of Texas sued tobacco companies "to
recover costs incurred in providing medical care and other benefits to
its citizens ... as the result of the citizens' use of cigarettes and
smokeless tobacco" 5  The defendants moved to dismiss the
complaint, arguing that the State could not "proceed as a direct action,
because the State's exclusive remedy is through assignment/subro-
gation pursuant to ... the Texas Human Resources Code'" 6 The
defendants also asserted that the State suffered no direct injury and
could not recover "because its injury [was] too remote' 2 7 The court
refused to dismiss the State's complaint on these grounds.0 '
In response to the defendant's argument that the State's exclusive
remedy was a subrogation action provided for by statute, the court held
that the State had an independent common law right to sue directly,
and that this common law right was not preempted by the Texas
Human Resources Code.09 According to the court, the State's right to
sue directly derived from its "quasi-sovereign interests'2"0 Citing a
201. See Hanoch Dagan & James J. White, Governments, Ciizens, and Injurious
Industres, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV 354 (2000).
202. See Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 E3d
229, 243 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing state tobacco claims based on statutory provisions).
203. Healthcare costs have, however, been included in municipal claims against the
gun industry that have been barred by the free public services doctrine. See, e.g., Ganim v.
Smith & Wesson Corp., 26 Conn. L. Rptr. 39,40-41 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999), aff 780 A.2d
98 (Conn. 2001).
204. Texas v. Am. Tobacco Co., 14 E Supp. 2d 956,962-63 (E.D. Tex. 1997). The case
was subsequently settled. Texas v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 5:96CV91, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17235 (E.D. Tex. 1998).
205. Am. Tobacco Co., 14 E Supp. 2d at 960.
206. Id. at 961.
207. Id.
208. Id
209. Id. at 965.
210. Id at 962.
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1982 United States Supreme Court case, the American Tobacco court
explained that:
Quasi-sovereign interests are to be distinguished from a state's
general sovereign or proprietary interests. "They consist of a set of
interests that the State has in the well-being of its populace." These
interests can related [sic] to either the physical or economic well-being
of the citizenry. It is without question that these interests can evolve
and change with time, and as such, the Court made very clear its desire
to maintain a definition that is conducive to a case-by-case analysis.
The only hard and fast rule set forth by the Court is that a State may not
invoke this doctrine when it is only a nominal party asserting the
interests of another"
The American Tobacco court concluded that the State, which "expends
millions of dollars each year in order to provide medical care to its
citizens;' was not a nominal party, and that its interest in seeking cost
recoupment was part of its quasi-sovereign interests in improving the
health and welfare of its citizens.2
In the course of its analysis of the State's common law right to
sue, the court distinguished the State's claim from that of the federal
government in United States v Standard Oil Co., the 1947 United
States Supreme Court case denying the federal government the right to
recover medical expenses of soldiers injured by tortfeasors that I
examined above in Part II2L3 First, the American Tobacco court
pointed out that Standard Oil involved the rejection of a claim by the
federal government, and that "quasi-sovereign interests have never
been held to be the basis for a suit brought by the federal
government' 1 4 Second, the court explained that "quasi-sovereign
interests only arise when a significant portion of the populace is
affected?'2  Because Standard Ol involved injury to only one citizen,
quasi-sovereign interests did not arise.216
In holding that the State's common law right to sue was not
preempted by statute, the American Tobacco court asserted that the
subrogation provisions of the Texas Human Resources Code did not
extinguish the State's common law rights to sue directly for
211. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458
U.S. 592, 602, 607 (1982) (granting the government of Puerto Rico standing to sue for job
discrimination against its citizens)).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 963 n.4 (discussing United States v. Standard Oil Co., 322 U.S. 301 (1947)).
214. Id.
215. Id
216. 332 U.S. at 302.
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reimbursement based on its quasi-sovereign interests. 2 7  The
defendants argued that the best explanation for creation of the statutory
provisions is that the State had no preexisting common law right to
reimbursement. 8 In response, the court countered that a better
explanation is that the State passed the provisions because it was
directed to do so pursuant to the mandatory provision of the federal
Social Security Act requiring states to seek reimbursement of
healthcare costs from tortfeasors as a condition of receiving federal
healthcare grants.1 9 The court went on to explain that interpreting the
statute according to the principle that "the presence of a statutory right
normally does not extinguish nonstatutory rights [was] more consistent
with the spirit of the reimbursement provisions of [the Act]" than the
defendants' assertion that the creation of statutory rights implies the
absence of common law rights. 0
The court also rejected the defendants' assertion that the State's
injury was too remote.2 The court held that the State's injury was
direct enough to confer standing as a matter of law, and that the State's
pleadings were sufficient to raise a question of fact regarding
proximate cause that should be resolved at trial.z2 Because the case
was settled, the issue of proximate cause never reached trial.
Amelican Tobacco provides us with two lessons that are relevant
to the free public services doctrine. First, the court's recognition of the
State's common law right to sue based on quasi-sovereign interests
implies that the free public services doctrine does not bar state claims
to recoup healthcare costs occasioned by tortfeasors. We should treat
this conclusion as tentative and limited. It is tentative because, due to
the settlement, this novel aspect of the court's holding was never
subjected to appellate review. 3 It is limited because quasi-sovereign
217. 14 E Supp. 2d at 963-65.
218. Id. at 963 n.5.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 965. It is interesting to compare the American Tobacco court's holding that
statutory rights of recovery did not preempt the government's common law right to recover to
the holding of the court in B.R Oil that the absence of any statutory rights preempted any
common law right of the government to recover. Compare id at 962, nith City of Bridgeton
v. B.P. Oil, Inc., 369 A.2d 49,53 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976). For a discussion of B.P? Oil,
see supm Part VB.
221. Am. Tobacco, 14 E Supp. 2dat967-68.
222. Id.
223. It has, however, been distinguished by courts involving claims by
nongovernmental entities and municipalities. See, e.g., Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 228 F3d 429,436 (3d Cir. 2000) (recognizing that a charitable hospital does not
have quasi-sovereign status); Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 26 Conn. L. Rptr. 39, 46 n.6
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interests provide a common law basis exclusively for state recoupment
claims. In distinguishing American Tobacco from Standard 0il, the
court held that quasi-sovereign interests would not support a federal
common law right to sue for recoupment of healthcare costs."4 The
court in Ganim, dismissing the City of Bridgeport's claim against gun
makers, held that municipalities, as creations of the state, do not have
quasi-sovereign status.' Furthermore, according to the American
Tobacco court, quasi-sovereign interests support state common law
claims only in cases involving harm to a significant portion of the
populace, not harms to single individuals or small groups. 6 Thus,
even if the court's analysis of quasi-sovereign interests were widely
accepted, the free public services doctrine might still bar healthcare
cost-recoupment claims by federal, municipal, and local governments,
as well as state claims involving injury to individuals or small groups.
As we shall see in the next Part, the doctrine has been employed to
deny recoupment of healthcare costs in claims by cities against the gun
industry.
A second lesson from American Tobacco is that government
healthcare costs occasioned by tortfeasors may not be considered too
remote to confer standing or to support findings of proximate cause."
Thus, if the free public services doctrine is a bar to such claims,
eliminating it may well clear the way to recovery. Again, we should be
careful of making too much of this conclusion. Not only was the
American Tobacco court's remoteness analysis not subject to appellate
review, it has been rejected by a number of courts considering similar
claims against the tobacco industry by union insurance funds"8 and by
several courts in municipal claims against gun makers.229
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1999), affU, 780 A.2d 98 (Conn. 2001) (recognizing that a municipality
does not have quasi-sovereign status).
224. Seesupmrnotes 213-215 and accompanying text.
225. 26 Conn. L. Rptr. at46 n.6.
226. 14 E Supp. 2d at 963-64; seesupranotes 215-216 and accompanying text.
227. 14 F. Supp. 2d at 967-68.
228. See, e.g., Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc.,
171 E3d 912, 926 (3d Cir. 1999) (rejecting union health and welfare fund suits against
tobacco companies on remoteness grounds). But see City of St. Louis v. Am. Tobacco Co.,
70 R Supp. 2d 1008, 1014 (E.D. Mo. 1999) (finding municipal plaintiff's claims against
tobacco companies not too remote).
229. See, e.g., Ganim, 26 Conn. L. Rptr. at 43-45 (finding that a municipality lacked
standing to bring a claim against a gun manufacturer based on remoteness); City of
Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A., Corp., 126 E Supp. 2d 882, 903-06 (E.D. Pa. 2000), affT 277
F.3d 415 (3d Cir. 2002) (rejecting a municipality's negligence claim against gun
manufacturers for lack of proximate cause). But see White v. Smith & Wesson, 97 E Supp.
2d 816, 825-26 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (finding a municipal claim against gun manufacturers not
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Thus, it is too early to tell how eliminating the free public
services doctrine might affect the future of government efforts to
recoup healthcare costs from tortfeasors. In the wake of the tobacco
wars, it is still unclear whether and to what extent the doctrine would
apply to government healthcare cost-recoupment claims. It is also
uncertain whether, even if the doctrine were eliminated, these claims
would still be blocked by remoteness.
D. Municipal Gun Li'gaion
The free public services doctrine has been relied upon to dismiss
claims against gun makers brought by Miami,30 Philadelphia,"'
Cincinnati,- 2 and Bridgeport, 33 and is currently at issue in a number of
other as yet unresolved city lawsuits.' Courts have declared the
doctrine inapplicable to similar claims by Boston35 and Cleveland.)6
Even without the doctrine, however, these municipal claims against the
gun industry face formidable challenges based on remoteness. As it
turns out, all of the courts that have rejected city suits based on the free
public services doctrine have also dismissed the suits for remoteness."
Thus, while eliminating the doctrine would clear one obstacle facing
many municipal gun claims, in order to be successful, cities would still
have to convince courts that their claims are not too remote.
This may be easier with respect to some costs related to gun
violence than others. Cities suing the gun industry are seeking to
recover a wide variety of expenses, including, for example, in the
barred by remoteness); City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 199902590,2000 WL
1473568, at *7 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 13, 2000) (same).
230. Penelas v. Arms Tech., Inc., No. 99-1941CA-06, 1999 WL 1204353, at *2 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. Dec. 13, 1999), aff' on other grounds, 778 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 799 So. 2d 218 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert denied, 799 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 2001).
231. Beretta, 126 F Supp. 2d at 894-95.
232. City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., [2000 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab.
Rep. (CCH) 15,880, at 55,181 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2000).
233. Ghnim, 26 Conn. L. Rptr. at 46 n.6.
234. For a complete list of pending lawsuits by municipalities against the gun industry,
see Summary of Pending City and County Lawsuits Against Gun Manufactures, Retailers
andDistibutors, 3 ANDREWs GuN INDuSTRY LMG. Rp'R., Dec. 2001, at 12, 12-14.
235. City ofBoston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 199902590,2000 WL 1473568, at
*8 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 13, 2000); see supm notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
236. White v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 97 F Supp. 2d 816, 821-23 (N.D. Ohio 2000).
237. Penelas v. Arms Tech., Inc., No. 99-1941CA-06, 1999 WL 1204353, at *2 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. Dec. 13, 1999), affd on other grounds, 778 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 799 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 2001) (lack of standing); City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A.,
Corp., 126 F Supp. 2d 882, 903 (E.D. Pa. 2000), aff'4 277 F3d 415 (3d Cir. 2002) (lack of
proximate cause); Beretta USA., [2000 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) at 55,175
(pure economic loss); Gank, 26 Conn. L. Rptr. at 41 (lack of standing).
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Boston case, "increased spending on law enforcement, emergency
rescue services, increased security at public schools and public
buildings, costs for coroner and funeral services for unknown victims,
pensions, disability, and unemployment benefits, higher prison costs
and youth intervention programs and lower tax revenues and lower
property values.' Cities would stand a better chance of recovery if
they focused on public service expenditures more closely linked to
actual gun violence or the threat of gun violence, such as the law
enforcement costs of responding to shooting incidents or patrolling
high crime areas, or emergency medical services for gunshot victims.
Recovery for expenditures such as those related to pensions and lost
tax revenues due to lower property values are likely to be rejected as
too remote, even in the absence of the free public services doctrine.
E. Politics, Cost-RecoupmentLitigation, andAbuse ofthe Tort
System
Talk of eliminating the free public services doctrine sparks fears
of a flood of politically motivated litigation that could drown legitimate
industries in litigation costs. State claims for the healthcare costs of
tobacco-related illness cowed the tobacco industry into an historic
$240 billion settlement."9 Municipal lawsuits to recoup the costs of
law enforcement and emergency services occasioned by gun violence
have already driven several gun manufacturers into bankruptcy or out
of business."' Who knows what unpopular industry will be the next
target of government-sponsored cost-recoupment litigation?
41
Reflecting this fear, the Ganim court wrote in reference to Bridgeport's
claims against the gun industry:
When conceiving the complaint in this case, the plaintiffs must have
envisioned [the state tobacco] settlements as the dawning of a new age
of litigation during which the gun industry, liquor industry and
238. Smith & Wesson, 2000 WL 1473568, at *3.
239. SeeDagan & white, supra note 201, at 364-65.
240. SeeMike Allen, Colt. to Curtail Sale oflHandguns, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 11, 1999, at
Al; Fox Butterfield, Lawsuits Lead Gun Maker to File for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, June 24,
1999, at A14; Smith & Wesson Sold at 'Fire Sale'Price, 2 ANDREvs GUN INusTRY LMG.
RPTR., June 2001, at 11.
241. For evidence that the paint industry is a leading candidate, see Jenny B. Davis, A
New Shade of Litgadon: State Allowed to Proceed in Lead-Paint Damages Suit Against
Manufacturers ABA 1. 18, 18 (July 2001). For less serious speculation, see Hershey,
Ordered to Pay Obese Amencans $135 Billion, available at http://www.theonion.com
onion3626lhersheys-pay-obese.html (Aug. 18, 2000) (on file with author), a satirical news
release concerning potential liability of chocolate manufacturer for obesity of consumers of
its snack foods.
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purveyors of "junk" food would follow the tobacco industry in
reimbursing government expenditures and submitting to judicial
regulation. 2
From this perspective, the free public services doctrine prevents
government from misusing the tort system to bully unpopular
industries.
While eliminating the free public services doctrine would indeed
have implications for the future of government cost-recoupment
litigation, fears of a flood of claims are exaggerated. It is possible that
the free public services doctrine's bright-line rejection of all
government claims for public service expenditures deters litigation and
that in its absence such claims would increase. As we have seen,
however, in the absence of the free public services doctrine, there will
still be restrictions on government cost-recoupment claims.
Remoteness doctrines such as standing, proximate cause, and the pure
economic loss rule limit government claims, and they do so in ways
that avoid the unfaimess, inefficiency, and judicial overreaching that
characterize the free public services doctrine. Moreover, eliminating
the free public services doctrine will cause government plaintiffs to
focus on the issue of remoteness, which may lead them to tailor their
claims more narrowly, including only public service expenditures
closely related to the defendant's allegedly tortious conduct. It is a
mistake to imagine the doctrine as a judicial finger in the dyke holding
back a sea of government tort claims against ordinary citizens and
unpopular industries. A better image would be a clog in the filtration
system through which tort claims must pass. Removing the clog will
not unleash a flood; rather it will make the system work better.
One might object that even if eliminating the free public services
doctrine would be a doctrinal improvement, it might still unleash a
political disaster. The remaining limitations provided by remoteness
doctrines might not be as effective at deterring politically motivated
government lawsuits that, regardless of their prospects of success in
the courts, can be used to blackmail unpopular industries into
accepting "voluntary" restrictions on manufacturing, promotion,
distribution, and sales practices. After all, state tobacco claims
resulted in the imposition of extensive new regulations on the tobacco
industry and billions of dollars of payments to state treasuries, without
a single claim being decided by a court.43 Similarly, municipal
242. 26 Conn. L. Rptr. at 41.
243. SeeDagan & White, supra note 201, at 365.
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lawsuits against gun makers pressured Colt to scale back its production
of handguns and Smith & Wesson to change its distribution and sales
practices, months before courts began to dismiss the suits in Miami,
Philadelphia, Cincinnati, and Bridgeport.' According to critics,
tobacco and gun litigation provide a blueprint for misusing the tort
system to impose regulations on industry in a way that circumvents the
legislative process."5 Perhaps the free public services doctrine, even
with its flaws, provides an important deterrent to this type of litigation,
which would proliferate if the doctrine were eliminated.
If the basis of this objection is true-that we should bar all
government cost-recoupment lawsuits in order to prevent politically
motivated misuse of the tort system-then the best way to do so would
be by means of legislation, not the free public services doctrine.
Especially if one is concerned about circumvention of the legislative
process, one should be wary of relying on courts to create a general
ban on government cost-recoupment suits, especially where there is
inadequate common law precedent for such a policy. We should,
instead, turn to legislatures. Thus, whether one is in favor of or against
government suits to recover public service expenditures, there are good
institutional grounds for favoring elimination of the free public
services doctrine.
E Government as a Tort Victim
Aside from the doctrinal and policy implications of eliminating
the free public services doctrine, there may be implications for our
political culture. Viewing the government as a tort victim undermines
the idea that somehow public services are free, as the doctrine
suggests. The costs of suppressing negligently started fires or cleaning
up oil spills or rescuing airline crash victims are losses to society as a
whole; they drain resources away from other private or government
activities. They are, ultimately, our losses. Allowing government to
sue for these losses in tort shows them to be real costs that someone
must bear, not merely free services. If the tortfeasors whose conduct
occasions these costs do not bear them, then all of us will. The free
public services doctrine spreads government losses so thin, and in a
way that is hidden from the view of ordinary citizens, that it creates the
impression that government's losses are costless to society.
244. See Lyton, Lawsui&Against the Gun Industry, supm note 92, at 1259-66.
245. See, e.g., Philip D. Oliver, Rejecting the "Wn'pping-Boy'Approach to TortLaw:
Well-Made HandgunsAre Not Defective Products, 14 U. ARK. LrrrLnE ROCK L.J. 1, 5 (1991).
2002] 779
TULANE LA WREVIEW
Eliminating the doctrine would encourage litigation-well publicized
in the case of industrial accidents-that portrays these losses as costs
for which someone must take responsibility. 6
The free public services doctrine is in some ways a mirror image
of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Just as the free public services
doctrine claims that government may not sue in common law tort, the
doctrine of sovereign immunity claims that government may not be
sued in common law tort. Viewing government as altogether immune
from tort liability-a doctrine rooted in the divine right of kings and
the idea that the sovereign can do no wrong-fits poorly within our
democratic political culture. Consequently, the Federal Tort Claims
Act and state equivalents grant citizens the right, albeit limited by
substantial exceptions, to sue the government in tort.247 Similarly, a
common law doctrine barring the government from recovering public
service costs from tortfeasors-costs that must otherwise be borne by
taxpayers-grates on democratic sensibilities. As was the better-
established doctrine of sovereign immunity, the free public services
doctrine should be replaced with a statutory scheme that generally
allows government to sue in tort for public service expenditures
subject to specific exceptions.
VILL CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have argued that courts should abandon the free
public services doctrine. A judicial invention of the 1970s, the
doctrine lacks solid precedential foundation. Moreover, judges have
failed to offer adequate justification for it. Perhaps most importantly,
the doctrine is bad public policy: it unfairly favors tortfeasors who
harm government, it constitutes an insurance scheme that is
distributively unfair and inefficient, and, in supporting it, courts are
exceeding the limits of their legitimate policy-making role.
Eliminating the free public services doctrine would leave in place more
established remoteness doctrines that limit liability but do not suffer
from these defects.
Simply overturning the doctrine in jurisdictions that have
adopted it would be justified, easy, and well within the legitimate
powers of the courts. If legislatures wished to reinstate the
doctrine, they would be free to do so. Abandoning the doctrine
246. For a discussion of the value of civic engagement for democratic culture, see
ROBERTD. PuTNAM, MAKING DIEmOCRACY WORK 87-88 (1993).
247. For a detailed discussion of sovereign immunity, see DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF
TORTS 663-749 (2000).
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would end an undesirable tort subsidy to careless industries and
place an appropriate limit on judicial loss spreading in the law of
torts.

